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Foreword
Several major DOD and NASA programs are seeking ways to reduce the costs of
launching spacecraft. However, it typically costs much, much more to build a spacecraft than
to launch it into a low orbit. Therefore, unless the costs of building spacecraft are reduced, even
dramatic reductions in costs of launching to low orbit would reduce total spacecraft program
costs by only a few percent.
This background paper examines several proposals for reducing the costs of spacecraft
and other payloads and describes launch systems for implementing them. It is one of a series
of products of a broad assessment of space transportation technologies undertaken by OTA
at the request of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the
House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. In 1988, OTA published the special
report Launch Options for the Future: A Buyer's Guide and the technical memorandum
Reducing Launch Operations Costs: New Technologies and Practices. In 1989, OTA
published the background paper Big, Dumb Boosters: A Low-Cost Space Transportation
Option? and the special report Round Trip to Orbit: Human Spaceflight Alternatives. A
summary report on space transportation, entitled Access to Space to be published in the spring
of 1990, will be the final report in the space transportation series.
In undertaking this effort, OTA sought the contributions of a wide spectrum of
knowledgeable individuals and organizations. Some provided information; others reviewed
drafts. OTA gratefully acknowledges their contributions of time and intellectual effort. OTA
also appreciates the cooperation and assistance of the Air Force and NASA. However, OTA
is solely responsible for the content of this background paper and the other OTA publications.
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Chapter 1

Summary
Several major efforts are aimed at finding
ways to reduce the cost of launching spacecraft.
However, it typically costs much, much more to
build a spacecraft than to launch it to low Earth
orbit (LEO). Unless spacecraft costs are reduced, even dramatic reductions in launch costs
will have only a small effect on total spacecraft
program costs.

THE HIGH COST OF
SPACECRAFT
Because of the high cost of spacecraft, a
dramatic reduction in launch cost alone will
not substantially lower spacecraft program
costs. Although launching a pound of payload to
LEO currently costs about $3,000, procuring
that pound of payload typically costs much
more. For example, representative U.S. spacecraft busses5 of types first launched between
1963 and 1978 cost between $130,000 and
$520,000 per pound dry,6 including amortized
program overhead costs. Procurement of the
mission payloads carried on those busses cost
about 50 percent more-about $200,000 to
$800,000 per pound. 7 Reducing launch costs
from $3,000 to $300 per pound of payload, a
goal of the Advanced Launch System program,8
would reduce the total cost of procuring and
launching a dry spacecraft (half bus, half
mission payload) by less than 2 percent.

This Background Paper reviews four possible
approaches to spacecraft design that have been
proposed to reduce total spacecraft program
costs. Adopting them could change the launch
rates, payload capacity, and reliability demanded
of conventional launch vehicles, or create a
demand for exotic launch systems to launch very
small spacecraft cheaply. Conversely, developing new, economical launch systems would
strengthen incentives to adopt these new approaches to spacecraft design.
This is one of several publications documenting OTA' s broad assessment of space transportation technologies requested by the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, and
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation. Previous publications in
this assessment examined a variety of future
launch options, 1 ways to reduce the costs of
launch operations,2 low-cost, low-technology
("big, dumb") boosters,3 and options for transporting humans to and from orbit. 4 A final report
will be published in 1990.

A spacecraft bound for a high orbit or another
planet requires an upper stage, which when
fueled is typically more than twice as heavy as
the spacecraft but costs less. Even so, a payload
consisting of a Centaur upper stage (about
$2,250 per pound) and a spacecraft weighing a
third as much (half bus, half mission payload)
might cost from $40,000 to $160,000 per pound.
Reducing launch costs to $300 per pound would

1U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Launch Options for the Future: A Buyer's Guide. OTA-ISC-383 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, July 1988).
2U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment, Reducing Launch Operations Costs: New Technologies and Practices, OTA-TM-ISC-28
(Washington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. September 1988).
3U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Big, Dumb Boosters: A Low-Cost Space Transportation Option? (Washington, DC: U.S.
Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. International Security and Commerce Program. February 1989).
4U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. Round Trip to Orbit: Human Spaceflight Alternatives. OTA-ISC-419 (Washington. DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office. August 1989).
5The "bus" of a spacecraft consists of the structure. power sources. and other subsystems required to support the mission payloads it carries.
6Unfueled.

7Space Systems and Operations Cost Reduction and Cost Credibility Workshop, Executive Summary (Washington. DC: National Security
Industrial Association. 1987). p. 3-10. fig. 3.7.3. These estimates were derived by amortizing nonrecurring costs (e.g., for development) over four
satellites; some programs procure more than four while others procure only one. OTA inflated the estimated costs. which were in 1982 dollars. to
1987 dollars using the GNP inflator from table B-3 of the Economic Report a/the President. January 1989. and then to 1989 dollars by assuming 4.2
percent annual inflation in 1987 and 1988.
8101 Stat. 1067.
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reduce the total cost of procuring and launching
such a payload by only 2 to 6 percent.

APPROACHES TO REDUCING
PAYLOAD COSTS
To reduce payload costs, and for other
reasons, novel approaches to payload design and
fabrication have been proposed:
• Design payloads to fit launch vehicles
leaving size and weight margins of about
15 percent
• Allow payloads to be larger and heavier:
Fatsats
• Allow satellites to be simpler, and make
them lighter: Lightsats
• Design Microspacecraft to be launched like
artillery shells
Each type of spacecraft-fatsat, lightsat, or
microspacecraft-would impose unique launch
demands. New, large launch vehicles would be
needed to launch the heaviest satellites.
Lightsats could be launched on existing launch
vehicles, but new, smaller launch vehicles might
launch them more economically. In wartime,
small launch vehicles could be transported or
launched by trucks or aircraft to provide a
survivable means of space launch. Microspacecraft could be launched on existing launch
vehicles, but they might instead be launched by
more exotic means such as a ram cannon,
railgun, coilgun, or laser-powered rocket. Some
of these might be proven feasible in the next
decade.

Weight margin: Designing payloads to fit
launch vehicles while reserving am pie size
and weight margins can reduce the risk of
incurring delay and expense after assembly
has begun.
It is often the case that satellites grow
substantially heavier than expected as they
proceed from design to construction. For ex-

ample, dry weights of military spacecraft have
been about 25 percent greater, on the average,
than initially predicted. Growth in estimated
weight may be caused by underestimating the
weight of a spacecraft (especially one designed
to use the most advanced technology) or by
changing mission requirements during development (requiring hardware to be added). If a
payload grows so heavy during assembly that it
threatens to "gross out" its assigned launch
vehicle (i.e., cause its weight to equal or exceed
the maximum allowable gross lift-off weight),
the payload must be redesigned to cut its weight.
This causes delay and increases cost.
To reduce the risk of exceeding vehicle
payload capacity, program managers could require designers to design each payload to fit its
assigned launch vehicle with room to spare and
to weigh substantially less than the maximum
weight the vehicle can launch to orbit. However,
this design philosophy would lead to more
stringent size and weight constraints than would
otherwise be imposed. If a mission simply could
not be performed by payloads predicted to be
small enough to fit the largest launch vehicles
with adequate size and weight margins, new,
larger launch vehicles would have to be developed to provide the desired margin. In many
cases, however, sufficient margin could be
provided by clever design, e.g., by designing
several smaller single-mission payloads instead
of a single multimission payload, or developing
and using an electric-powered or space-based
orbital transfer vehicle (OTV) instead of a
conventional OTV. 9

Fatsats: If payloads were allowed to be
heavier for the same capability, some could
cost substantially less. For example, OTA
estimates that Titan-class payloads that cost
several hundred million dollars might cost
about $130 million less if allowed to be five
times as heavy.

9'Jb place a satellite in a high orbit. a launch vehicle must carry both the satellite and either an upper stage to take the satellite directly to the high
orbit. or an oTV to take the satellite from a low-altitude parking orbit to the high orbit. A conventional OTV weighs two or three times as much as the
satellite it carries. An electric"powered OTV could weigh less than a conventional OTV of comparable capability. creating more weight margin. A
space-based OTV could be launched separately from its payload. allowing the payload to weigh as much as its launch vehicle could carry while reserving
the desired weight margin. However. operation of space-based OTVs would be complex and require costly infrastructure.
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If payloads were allowed to be much heavier,
a manufacturer could forego expensive processes for removing nonessential structural material, as well as expensive analyses and tests for
assuring the adequacy of the remaining structure. Standardized subsystems, which could be
produced economically in quantity, could be
used instead of customized subsystems designed to weigh less.

The savings that might be realized are uncertain. In principle, they could be estimated by
comparing the costs of a heavy payload and a
light payload that perform the same functions
with the same capability. However, the United
States has never designed and built two payloads, one heavy and the other light, that
perform the same functions equally well, in
order to compare actual costs. A few estimates
have been derived by comparing the cost and
weight of an actual spacecraft with the estimated
cost and weight of hypothetical heavier spacecraft of comparable capability. Designers have
also compared the estimated costs and weights
of hypothetical spacecraft of comparable capability and different weights. All such studies
predict payloads could cost less if allowed to
weigh more, but the estimates of savings differ.
An accurate estimate of potential savings
requires a detailed trade-off analysis for each
payload. Achieving these savings will probably
require giving spacecraft program managers,
and those who establish mission and spacecraft
requirements, incentives crafted specifically for
the purpose, and may require developing new
launch or orbital-transfer vehicles to carry the
spacecraft.

Lightsats: If allowed to be less capable,
reliable, or long-lived, payloads could be both
lighter and less expensive. Useful functions
such as communications and weather surveillance could be performed by payloads small
enough to be launched on small rockets from
airborne or transportable launchers.

Small, simple, and relatively inexpensive
civil and military satellites have been, and still
are, launched at relatively low cost on small
launch vehicles or at even lower cost, sometimes
for free, as "piggyback" payloads on larger
launch vehicles.
The Department of Defense is considering
whether the increased survivability and responsiveness such spacecraft CQuld provide would
compensate for possibly decreased capability.
Some missions might be accomplished as well
by a swarm of several small satellites as by a
single large one. If so, a swarm would be less
expensive in many cases, because smaller satellites typically cost much less per pound than do
large ones. Even if the satellites were launched
individually, which would increase total launch
cost, total mission cost might be lower.

Microspacecraft: Spacecraft weighing only
a few pounds could perform useful space
science missions and might be uniquely economical for experiments requiring simultaneous measurements (e.g., of solar wind) at
many widely separated points about the
Earth, another planet, or the Sun.
These could be launched on existing launch
vehicles. Eventually, it may be possible to
launch them on laser-powered rockets or, if they
are as rugged as a cannon-launched guided
projectile,lO with a ram cannon or an electromagnetic launcher. Within the next decade,
experiments now being planned may establish
the feasibility of some of these launch systems.
Their costs cannot be estimated confidently
until feasibility is proven, but at high launch
rates they might be more economical than
conventional rockets. An electromagnetic launcher
could also be constructed in orbit to launch
microspaceprobes to outer planets; they would
arrive years earlier than if they were propelled
by conventional rockets.

lOA cannon-launched guided projectile is an artillery shell equipped with a system (e.g. TV camera and computer) for recognizing a target and
movable fins or other means for steering the projectile toward a target. The Army's M712 Copperhead is an example.
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OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS
What can Congress do to promote spacecraft
cost reduction and, thereby, reduce the cost of
space programs? Some options deal directly
with spacecraft design; others would promote
the development of launch systems that could
launch small, inexpensive spacecraft at low cost
or heavy spacecraft with generous weight margins.
Options for Influencing Spacecraft Design
Option 1:

Congress could order a comprehensive study
of how much the Nation could save on space
programs by:
• designing payloads to reserve more weight
and volume margin on a launch vehicle;
• allowing payloads to be heavier, less
capable, shorter-lived, or less reliable;
• designing standard subsystems and buses
for use in a variety of spacecraft;
• designing spacecraft to perform single
rather than multiple missions; and
• using several inexpensive satellites instead
of a single expensive one.

Lockheed completed such a study in 1972; 11
a new one should consider current mission needs
and technology. It would complement the Space
Transportation Architecture Study (STAS) and
more recent and ongoing studies 12 that compare
space transportation options but not payload
design options.
As noted above, to estimate potential savings
accurately, a detailed trade-off analysis must be
done for each payload, or more generally, for
each mission. So, for greater credibility:

Option 2:

Congress could require selected spacecraft
programs-for example, those that might require a new launch vehicle to be developed-to
award two design contracts, one to a contractor
who would consider the unconventional approaches mentioned above.
Option 3:

Congress could require both the Department
ofDefense and NASA to refrain from developing
a spacecraft if the expected weight or size of the
spacecraft, together with its propellants, upper
stage, and support equipment, would exceed
some fraction of the maximum weight or size
that its intended launch vehicle can accommodate. Public Law 100-456 required the Department of Defense to require at least 15
percent weight margin in fiscal year 1989.1 3
New legislation could extend this restriction to
NASA and could require size margins in future
years.
Options for Promoting the Development of
Launch Systems
Option 4:

Congress could fund the development of the
Shuttle-C cargo launch vehicle, the Advanced
Launch System, liquid-fueled rocket boosters
for the Shuttle, or a larger Titan launch
vehicle. 14 Any of these vehicles could launch
payloads larger and thus less expensive (for
comparable performance) than payloads designed to fly on Shuttles or Titan IVs~ Alternatively, if payload size and weight are not
increased, these proposed launch vehicles could
provide greater size and weight margins, thereby
reducing the risk of needing costly weightreduction efforts. However, their greater payload capacity would also enable payload pro-

llLockheed Missiles and Space Co., Impact of Low-Cost Refurbishable and Standard Spacecraft Upon Future NASA Space Programs, NTIS
N72-27913, Apr. 30, 1972.
12E.g., the Air Force's Air Force-Focused STAS, NASA's Next Manned Space Transportation System study, the Defense Science Board's National
Space Launch Strategy study, and the Space Transportation Comparison study for the National Aero-Space Plane Program.
\3See S. Rept. 100-326, p. 36, and H. Rept. 100-989, p. 282.
14The costs and benefits of these launch systems would differ; see U.S. Congress, op. cit., footnote I, and the forthcoming finm report of this
assessment.
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gram managers to forego these potential savings
and instead pursue greater payload performance
by increasing payload size or weight. If they do
so and weight overrun occurs, it would probably
cost more to trim the weight of a larger payload
than it would to reduce the weight of a lighter
payload by the same percentage. Requiring
weight margins, as described above, would
reduce this risk.
Option 5:

Congress could continue to fund the development of the Standard Small Launch Vehicle
(SSLyt5) and the Sea Launch and Recovery
(SEALAR) system 16 to provide survivable means
of launching military lightsats. The Department
of Defense probably will not allow operational
lightsats to be designed for such launch vehicles
until the vehicles are operational. Hybrid rockets, which can use liquid oxygen to burn
nonexplosive solid propellant similar to tire
rubber, could also be designed to launch
lightsats from transportable launchers. Such
hybrids would have some safety advantages and
might be allowed where conventional solid- or
liquid-fuel rockets are not. Later-perhaps by
2005-NASP-derived vehicles might be able to
launch 20,000-pound payloads in wartimeP
With continued funding, the National AeroSpace Plane Program would continue to develop
technology for NASP-derived vehicles.
Option 6:

coilgun, or ram cannon) for launching microspacecraft at high rates economically. Many
uses have been proposed, but to date only the
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SOlO)
has identified a plausible demand for high-rate
launches of microspacecraft. However, demand
for launches of scientific, commercial, and other
microspacecraftcould increase, perhaps dramatically, if launch costs could be reduced to a few
hundred dollars per pound and payloads were
inexpensive. The SOlO estimates development
and construction· of a laser for launching 44pound payloads would require about $550
million over 5 or 6 years. The SOlO estimates
it could launch up to 100 payloads per day (more
than 20 Shuttle loads per year) for about $200
per pound.
Railgun proponents predict a prototype
railgun capable oflaunching 1,1 OO-pound projectiles carrying 550 pounds of payload could be
developed in about 9 years for between $900
million and $6 billion, including $50 million to
$5 billion for development of projectiles and
tracking technology. If produced and launched
at a rate of 10,000 per year, the projectiles (less
payload) would cost between $500 and $30,000
per pound (estimates differ). The cost oflaunching them might be as low as $20 per pound-i.e.,
$40 per pound of payload.

Congress could fund the development of a
laser or a direct-launch system (e.g., a railgun,

ISThe SSLV is being developed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).
16SEALAR is being developed by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory.
17See U.S. Congress, op. cit., footnote 4, pp. 67 and 74.

Chapter 2

Weight and Volume Margins
As payloads progress from the drawing board (or
computer-aided design workstation) to the launch
pad, their volumes tend to expand to fill the payload
fairings of their betrothed launch vehicles, and their
weights tend to grow to the maximum that the launch
vehicles can launch. Dry weights of representative
U.S. military satellites have been about 25 percent
greater, on the average, than the estimates of dry
weight made when they were proposed. l On occasion, satellites grow so heavy that their assigned
launch vehicles would be unable to place them in the
desired orbits. When this happens, drastic and
expensive efforts are undertaken to reduce the
weight of the satellite-and sometimes of the launch
vehicle as well. A TRW executive has said, "We
have to spend numbers like $150,000 a pound trying
to get the last few pounds out of a spacecraft. "2

TRW may also allow a margin of 15 percent or
more for greater-than-expected weight growth, initially. TRW estimates that the value of weight
margin increases with decreasing margin, from zero
at 15 percent margin, to $5,000 to $10,000 per pound
at 5 to 10 percent margin, to $40,000 per pound at
percent margin, to as much as $100,000 per pound
at negative margin, depending on the time remaining
before launch (figure 2-1). Margins are seldom
negative at an early design stage; if margin becomes
negative shortly before the spacecraft is to be
launched, expensive redesign may be required to
reduce the spacecraft weight below the maximum
weight specified in the contract, and TRW estimates
that it may be worth up to about $100,000 per pound
to avoid this. This is much greater than the cost of
transporting a typical spacecraft to its operational
orbit: about $15,000 to $30,000 per pound to
geosynchronous orbit, as estimated by TRW.3

°

A contract for spacecraft development and production typically specifies that the spacecraft perform certain functions and not weigh more than a
specified maximum weight. Usually this maximum
weight is chosen to be less than the maximum weight
a particular launch vehicle can place in the desired
orbit. The difference between these two values
provides a margin that allows for contingencies such
as less-than-expected launch vehicle thrust.

TRW notes that spacecraft designed to incorporate advanced-technology subsystems can consume weight margins with unusual rapidity, leading
to redesign (which may require 3 or 4 months),
increased risk, and possibly additional redesign, as
well as downward revision of' 'requirements." Two

The spacecraft designer initially tries to design the
spacecraft to perform the specified functions and not
weigh more than the specified maximum weight,

Figure 2-1-Value of Weight Margin

minus

Marginal value of margin ($1,OOO/lb.)

1. a "contingency" amount by which the estimated weight of the spacecraft is expected to
grow as the design matures, and
2. a "weight margin" representing greater-thanexpected growth in the estimated weight as the
design matures.

-- GEO laun h (Titan IV
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Based on its experience producing high-tech government spacecraft and spacecraft subsystems, TRW
expects weight to grow ultimately 15 percent larger
than initial estimates and hence budgets a contingency of 15 percent initially. As the design matures
and the estimated weight increases as expected, the
contingency budget is decreased.
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SOURCE: TRW (plotted by OTA).

lp. Hillebrandtet al., Space Division Unmanned Space Vehicle Cost Model, SixlhEdition, SD TR-88-97 (Los Angeles AFB, CA: Headquarters, Space
Systems Division, U.S. Air Force Systems Command, November 1988), p. VIII-6; distribution limited to U.S. Government agencies only.
2G.W. Elverum, Jr., •'Reliability Up!Costs Down Through Simplicity," Space Systems Productivity and Manufacturing Coriference IV (EI Segundo,
CA: Aerospace Corp., 1987), pp. 175-196.
3Clarlt Kirby, TRW, personal communication, Nov. 16, 1988.
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redesign cycles totaling 6 to 8 months could lead to
a 10 to 25 percent cost growth. TRW also notes that
volume constraints are also costly.

with the proposed satellite, and shall not approve for
development a block change if the proposed payload
weight exceeds the weight of the existing payload;6

How much margin should be reserved? Reserving
too little increases the risk of delay and cost overrun,
should redesign become necessary, because weight
growth exceeds expectations late in a development
program. Yet reserving too much margin imposes an
opportunity cost: one either foregoes the opportunity
to add extra fuel or equipment, and hence capability,
to the payload, or one foregoes the opportunity to
make the payload less expensive by allowing it to be
heavier. In the latter case, the opportunity cost is
tangible and can be estimated.4 The optimal margin
will be that at which the marginal opportunity cost
of not making the payload a pound heavier equals
the marginal value that the additional margin would
provide by reducing risk of cost overrun and
schedule slippage.

This language was endorsed in conference7 and
signed into law. 8

If the marginal value of weight margin is as
estimated by TRW (see figure 2-1), then a margin of
11 to 12 percent would be optimal for a Titan IV
payload.5 This is comparable to the margin (15
percent) that Public Law 100-456 required the
Department of Defense to reserve for satellites DoD
approves for development in fiscal year 1989. In
reporting on the National Defense Authorization Act
for fiscal year 1989, the Senate Committee on
Armed Services proposed requiring that
... the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
shall not approve for development a new satellite if
the proposed payload weight exceeds 85 percent of
the lift capacity of the launch vehicle(s) identified

The expectation that increasing weight margins
would reduce cost risk does not imply that it would
save money to build a new launch vehicle large
enough to launch the heaviest payloads with increased weight margins. Predicting whether it would
save money would require comparing the cost of
developing the vehicle with the total benefits it
would provide-including the reduction in cost risk
that increased weight margins would provide. Ironically, building larger launch vehicles could increase
this risk: Without discipline, payloads might still be
designed to allow little margin, and margins could
still be tight or negative, but with greater consequence. To eliminate a I-percent negative margin,
one would have to trim 2,000 pounds from a
200,000-pgund payload, compared to only 390
pounds in the case of a 39,000-pound payload. In
some cases this could be done by carrying less fuel
than planned and accepting reduced payload performance. If not, reducing the dry weight of a
200,OOO-pound payload by 1 percent would cost
$240 million more than reducing the dry weight of
a 39,000-pound payload by 1 percent, if weight
reduction costs $150,000 per pound. This illustrates
why allowing margin for, and controlling, weight
growth will be much more important for large
payloads (such as proposed heavy-lift launch vehicles could carry) than for smaller ones.

4See "A Parametric Analysis" in ch. 3.
sViz. a payload that would cost between $100 million and $5 billion if built to weigh 39,000 poWlds-i.e., to reserve no margin.
68. Rept. 100-326, p. 36.
7H. Rept. 100-989, p. 282.
as. Rept. 100-326 did not specify whether the [estimate of] proposed satellite weight should include expected weight growth in addition to the nominal
weight estimated from the design for the satellite. If so, Public Law 100-456 would require at least a 15 percent weight margin in addition to whatever
weight growth is expected. If the payload consisted solely of an unfueled satellite, 25 percent weight growth would be expected [Po Hillebrandt et aI.,
op. cit., footnote I, pp. VIll-61, so Public Law 100-456 would require a40 percent weight margin in addition to the nominal weight estimated from tile
design for the satellite.

Chapter 3

Fatsats
Many experts find it plausible that a payload
could be designed to perfonn a function at lower cost
if it were allowed to be heavier. However, there have
been few attempts to estimate just how much cheaper
payloads could be, if allowed to be heavier, or how
much they should weigh in order to minimize the
total cost of producing and launching a payload.

(expressed as a fraction) of nontecurring to recurring
cost. For example, the ratio of nonrecurring cost to
recurring cost is typically 2/1 for a spacecraft bus
(see table 3-1), so the nonrecurring cost of developing a spacecraft bus is about twice the recurring cost
of producing a bus. If a mission requires one
spacecraft, the cost of developing and producing a
custom bus would be about three times the cost of
producing a suitable previously developed bus. By
using a previously developed bus, one could therefore save about two-thirds of the cost of a customized bus. 3 The cost would be reduced by a factor of
3, i.e., by 1 plus the ratio of nonrecurring cost to
recurring cost (2/1).

The first section of this chapter discusses one of
several ways in which payloads could be made less
expensive if allowed to be heavier: standard subsystems could be used in lieu of customized subsystems
designed to minimize weight. The next section
describes how a high-altitude satellite could be
allowed to be heavier (and hence less expensive)
without using a larger launch vehicle: by using an
orbital transfer vehicle with electric engines (e.g.,
an::jets). The third section discusses estimation of
cost versus weight trade-offs, with subsections
describing parametric and bottom-up methods and
comparing parametric with bottom-up estimates.
The final section discusses some organizational
obstacles to reducing cost by allowing payload
weight growth.

More could be saved on subsystems with higher
ratios. For example, the cost of structure, which has
ratios ranging from 5/1 to 8/1, could be reduced by
a factor of at least 6, and possibly 9.
The amount saved could be a small percentage of
total spacecraft program costs, which also include
the costs of mission-peculiar payloads and program
overhead, etc. A 1972 Lockheed study4 concluded
that development and use of standard subsystems
could save only about 4 percent of the cost of 91
payload programs, when used in addition to low-cost
design methods and payload refurbishment. The
savings attributable to standardization would be
about 6 percent of the program costs already reduced
by low-cost design and refurbishment.s

STANDARDIZING SUBSYSTEMS
One of several ways to trade off cost for weight is
to use standard spacecraft subsystems l or busses. 2
The use of a standard or previously developed
subsystem may result in a heavier spacecraft but
allow a satellite program to avoid paying part or all
of the substantial nonrecurring costs of developing
a custom subsystem. In addition, because of learning
and production-rate effects, it helps reduce the
recurring cost of producing the standard subsystem.

Manufacturers have estimated that 95 percent
learning might be achieved, i.e., every time the
cumulative number of units produced is doubled, the
incremental unit cost woWa decrease 5 percent. 6 The
Air Force has ass~ ~ percent learning in
estimating first-unit pFoduction costs from lot sizes

Using a standard subsystem could reduce subsystem cost by a factor roughly equal to 1 plus the ratio

1See•e.g.• Lockheed Missiles and Space Co .• Impact ofLow-Cost Refurbishable and Standard Spacecraft Upon Future NASA Space Programs. NTIS
N72-279l3. Apr. 30. 1972.
2A spacecraft' 'bus" consists of those spacecraft subsystem&--<:.g. structure. thermal control. telemetry. attitude control. power. and propulsion-that
are nOI peculiar to a particular mission. as cameras or radio relays would be.
3The cost of integrating an off-the-shelf subsystem into a spacecraft is smail. The Boeing Company's Parametric Cost Model predicts that the c~st
of integrating an off-the-shelf subsystem into a spacecraft would be about 3 percent of the cost of designing a new subsystem for the spacecraft. [Boemg
Aerospace Co .• May 1989]
4Lockheed Missiles and Space Co.• op. cit.. footnote 1.
sin this study. Lockheed assumed a "mission model" now recognized as highly inflated; this probably led to ov.erestimation of the potential savings
from standardization. On the other hand. the percentage savings attributable to standardization might have been greater if refurbishment had not been
assumed.
'
. 6F.K. Fong el aI.• Unmanned Spacecraft Cost Model. 5th ed .• SD-TR-81-45 (Los Angeles AFB. CA: HeadquarterS. Space Sy~s
U.S.
Air Force Systems Command. June 1981); NTIS accession number AD-B06O 824L; distribution limited to U.S. Govermnent agencIes 0 y.

Dinrision.
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Table 3-1-Ratlos of Nonrecurring to Recurring Cost
of Spacecraft Subsystems
If a previOUsly developed subsystem can be used in a new spacecraft
in lieu of a custom-designed subsystem, subsystem cost could be
reduced by a factor roughly equal to one plus the ratio of nonrecurring
to recurring cost-e.g., threefold for a spacecraft bus (a spacecraft without its mission payload).
Ranges of ratios
nonrecurring cost!
Subsystem
recurring cost
Structure ............................ .
5/1 to 8/1
Propulsion (apogee kick) .............. .
211 to 6/1
Thermal control ...................... .
4/1 to 40/1
1/1 to 211
Attitude control ....................... .
Electrical power ...................... .
1/1 to 211
Telemetry, tracking, & command ........ .
211 to 3/1
about 2/1
Spacecraft (less mission payload) ....... .
Communications mission payload ....... .
211 to 3/1
SOURCE: U.S. Air Force Systems Command, Space Systems Division.

and prices,7 but there have been too few buys of each
type of U.S. spacecraft to demonstrate learning
conclusively.

UPPER STAGES AND ORBITALTRANSFER VEHICLES
Often a payload has an upper stage or an
orbital-transfer vehicle (OTV) in addition to a
spacecraft. Some analysts have considered options
for reducing the costs of upper stages by allowing
them to be heavier.8 Others are considering the
opposite approach: making OTVs smaller-and
perhaps more expensive--in order to save money by
using a smaller launch vehicle, allowing the spacecraft to be larger, or providing more margin for
spacecraft weight growth. Space-based OTV shave
also been proposed;9 they could be reused and would
not be launched together with the spacecraft, which
could therefore be larger. However, refueling and
maintaining them could be complicated and might
require the development and maintenance of costly
space- or ground-based infrastructure.
Electric propulsion could be used to make OTV s
smaller and lighter while at the same time increasing

the mass they could deliver to a high orbit. They
could use photovoltaic ("solar") cells to generate
electricity 10 to power an electrostatic ion thruster, an
arcjet thruster, or an electric engine of some other
type (many are possible) that has an exhaust velocity
much greater than that of a chemical rocket. This
would reduce the mass of fuel required for orbital
transfer, increasing the payload that could be transferred. The "dry weight" of an electric OTV
(EOTV) could also be smaller than that of a chemical
OTV of comparable total impulse, further increasing
the payload that could be transferred.
There would be drawbacks. An EOTV would
produce little thrust, so transfer of a payload from a
low-altitude parking orbit to geostationary orbit
might take 3 to 6 months. Before reaching its
destination orbit, the payload would age a few
months and, more important, might degrade because
of its longer transit through the Van Allen radiation
belts. An EOTV would be designed to tolerate such
a transit, but some satellites might not be. A
near-term solution would be to shield sensitive
satellites against the radiation, but this would reduce
the maximum satellite mass that could be carried.
The longer transfer time could also be detrimental
to security. A military satellite on an EOTV would
remain longer at low altitude and within range of
low-altitude anti-satellite weapons than if it rode a
conventional OTV to its destination orbit. If a
critical satellite fails or is damaged, an EOTV might
not be able to replace it without a serious lapse in
mission performance. II These drawbacks could be
mitigated by launching military satellites on schedule rather than on demand. That is, near the end of
its projected useful life, each satellite would be
deactivated, maintained as a spare, and replaced by
a new satellite, which could have been launched
months earlier.
The Air Force Systems Command Space Systems
Division estimates that EOTVs would be more
economical than conventional OTV s for selected

7p. Hillebrandt et al., Space Division Unmanned Space Vehicle Cost Model, Sixth Edition, SO TR-88-97 (Los Angeles AFB, CA: Headquarters, Space
Systems Division, U.S. Air Force Systems Command, November 1988); distribution limited to U.S. Government agencies only.
80ani Eder, "Why Spacecraft Should Get Less Expensive If Launch Costs Oecrease," unpublished, undated, marked "0582-10003-1." Boeing
presented results of this analysis at the ALS Phase 1System Requirements Review, and to OTA in a briefing, .. ALS Program Development.'· See also
Hughes Aircraft Co., Space and Communications Group, Design Guide for ALS Payloads. October 1988.
9E.g., see Lockheed Missiles and Space Co .. Final ReporE-Payload Effects Analysis Study, LMSC-A990556 (Sunnyvale, CA: June 1971). NTIS
accession number N71-3749630; and J.M. Sponable and J.P. Penn, "Electric Propulsion for Orbit Transfer: ACase Study," Journal of Propulsion and
Power, vol. 5, No.4, July-August 1989. pp. 445451.
IONuclear power was once considered more promising; see Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., op. cit., footnote 9.
II However. in some scenarios, neither could a conventional OTY.
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mISSIons. For example, a 5,250-pound spacecraft
could be launched to geostationary orbit either on a
Titan IV launch vehicle with an Inertial Upper Stage
for about $250 million or on a Delta II launch vehicle
with a solar-electric OTV for about $124 million,12
saving about $126 million. A Titan IV with an
EOTV could launch a 30,OOO-pound spacecraft to
geostationary orbit for an estimated cost of $269
million. The Space Systems Division is planning to
demonstrate an expendable solar-powered EOTV,
probably with an experimental payload, sometime
between 1993 and 1995.

ESTIMATING POTENTIAL
COST REDUCTION
There have been few attempts to estimate how
much cheaper spacecraft could be, if allowed to be
heavier, or optimal weights for minimal production
and launch costs. Analyses of historical data show
that heavier spacecraft are typically costlier than
lighter spacecraft; 13 usually, however, heavier spacecraft are also more capable than lighter spacecraft.
They perform more functions, more difficult functions, or similar functions better. 14 So these analyses
do not answer the important questions:
1. How heavy should a payload lS be in order to

minimize the combined costs of payload
production and launch on a currently operational launch vehicle? Are payload weights
actually optimized for current launch vehicles?
2. How heavy should a payload be in order to
minimize combined production and launch
cost, if the launch cost per pound of payload
were reduced, or the maximum payload weight
that could be launched were increased, by
some factor? By what factor would total
payload production and launch cost be reduced?
Answering these questions requires comparing
the costs of heavy payloads and light payloads that
perform the same function equally well. Unfortunately, such data do not exist; there are no two

payloads, one large and the other small, designed at
the same time (and hence with comparable technology available) to perform the same set of functions
equally well. The few analyses that have estimated
how much cheaper a payload could be if allowed to
be heavier have been hypothetical. They are based
on both "bottom-up" and parametric estimates.

Bottom-up estimates are obtained by designing
two or more versions of a payload to perform the
same functions at minimum cost without exceeding
weight or size limits, which differ from version to
version. For example, two versions of a communications satellite could be designed: one to be launched
on a Scout launch vehicle, the other on an AtlasCentaur. Each version would be designed to minimize production and launch cost. Comparing the
costs of the two different versions would indicate
how much less expensive the larger version would
be.
Bottom-up estimates are time-consuming and
expensive to derive, and there may be no basis for
assuming the cost-versus-weight trade-offs derived
would apply to versions larger or smaller than those
designed or to payloads that must perform different
functions. For example, there is no rationale for
expecting that bottom-up estimates of costs and
weights of communications satellites of comparable
capability could be used to illustrate cost-versusweight trade-offs for remote-sensing satellites of
comparable capability.

Parametric estimates are obtained by assuming
that if the weight of a payload were allowed to
increase, the minimum cost at which it could be built
would vary in some qualitative way-e.g., approach
a limit, or decrease exponentially. The parameters of
the relationship-e.g., the minimum costs for particular weight limits-are chosen to make the hypothetical relationship fit historical cost and weight
data, bottom-up cost and weight estimates, or both,
as well as possible.
The fit will not be exact, however; 16 it may be a
good fit on the average, with some payloads costing

12Including $3 million for RDT&E.
13p. Hillebrandt et al., op. cit., footnote 7, and figure 4-1 of Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., op. cit., footnote 9.
14See Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., op. cit., footnote 9.
ISThe payload of a launch vehicle may be a spacecraft (e.g., a satellite or planetary probe) together with an upper stage (to propel it to a transfer orbit
or escape trajectory) and support equipment for attaching them to and releasing them from the launch vehicle. Some launch vehicles (e.g., the Space
Shuttle and sounding rockets) sometimes carry payloads (e.g., scientific instruments) that remain attached to the launch vehicle.
16Unless there are so many parameters (i.e., statistical degrees of freedom) in the model that the available data are too few to estimate them with
statistical significance.
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more, and others less, than predicted by the relationship (the "model"). The fact that the model
represents only average costs and cost-versusweight trends may be an advantage in studies, such
as this one, which focus on such averages and trends.
However, it would be a limitation if accurate
cost-versus-weight trade-offs for a specific mission
were required. If the functions to be performed by
the payload were specified in detail, and if resources
permitted detailed engineering design of several
alternative versions of different weights or sizes,
then bottom-up estimation could be used and should
provide greater accuracy.
Thus bottom-up estimation and parametric estimation are complementary approaches to cost estimation.l7 Neither approach by itself would be of
general value: a bottom-up estimate is applicable
only to a specific payload, and parametric estimates
are abstract and hence useless unless fitted to
bottom-up estimates of cost and weight. I8
The bottom-up and parametric approaches are
exemplified by two analyses produced almost two
decades ago: a parametric model developed by Carl
Builder at the Rand COrp.,19 and a bottom-up
analysis by Lockheed Missiles and Space CO.2O Both
were cited in congressional debate on the merits of
the Space Shuttle. 21

A Parametric Analysis
Builder did not estimate cost reductions for
particular payloads; he described a procedure for
doing so using data or assumptions about payload
cost and launch cost. He assumed average launch
cost would vary as the payload capability of the
launch vehicle raised to some power A (this is called
a "power-law" relationship) and payload cost
would vary as the payload weight raised to some

power B. To use Builder's model, one must specify
the exportent A and the initial cost and weight of a
payload designed to minimize payload plus current
launch cost. One need not specify what the payload
does; in theory, it should make no difference. If
launch costs are reduced by some factor,22 the
optimum weight and the cost of a functionally
equivalent payload designed to minimize payload
plus reduced launch cost may be calculated using
formulas derived by Builder. The difference between the old and new minimum total costs is the
savings obtainable if launch costs are reduced by the
specified factor, assuming payloads are reoptimized
to take advantage of the new launch costs. 23
OTA derived an estimate of the exponent A used
in Builder's model by fitting a straight line to points
on a log-log plot of the payload capabilities24 and
average launch costs25 of Delta, Titan, and the Space
Shuttle. Figure 3-1 shows the three points and the
line obtained as a least-squares fit to the points. The
slope of the line corresponds to a value of 0.74 for
the exponent A, implying that average launch cost
would increase by two-thirds if the payload weight
were doubled.
Figure 3-1 also shows a point representing the
predicted payload capability of the Pegasus airlaunched vehicle (see figure 4-6) and the price
charged by its operator, Orbital Sciences Corp.
(OSC) , for the launches and launch options purchased by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency. The line fitted to Delta, Titan, and Shuttle
costs and payload capabilities accurately predicted
the cost (to the government) of a Pegasus launch.
If launch cost is assumed to vary with payload
weight in the way described above,26 Builder's
model predicts that a payload that would cost $1
billion if designed to weigh 39,000 pounds could be

17U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Reducing Launch Operations Costs: New Technologies and Practices, OTA-TM-ISC-28
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1988), app. A.
18As noted above, there is seldom more than one historical •'data point" for the COSI and weight of functionally identical spaceraft.
19CarI H. Builder, Are Launch Vehicle Costs a Bottleneck to Economical Space Operations? Rand working document D-I9482-PR, December 1969.
2IlI..ockheed Missiles and Space Co., op. cit., footnote 9.
:uSee the remarks of Senator Mondaie in the Congressional Record-&nare, May 26, 1971, pp. 17100-17106, and the remarks of Senator Anderson
in the Congressional Record-Senate, Apr. 20, 1972, pp. 13786-13790.
22By the same factor, regardless of payload weight.
23More precisely, "assuming payloads are optimally sized for minimum total cost in both cases." Builder, op. cit., footnote 19.
24Th a 100 n.mi.-high orbit inclined 28.5 degrees. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Launch Options/or the Future: A Buyer's Guide,
OTA-ISC-383 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1988), table 2-1.
2SIncluding amortized fixed annual launch cost. OTA assumed launch at the maximum rate estimated in table A-I of ibid. and used the nominal
COSI-estimating relationships in that table.
26I.e., in proportion to the payload capability of the launch vehiCle raised to the power 0.74.
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Figure 3-1-Average Launch Cost v.
Payload capabUity

Figure 3-2--Cost for Hypothetical Mission With
Current Launch Cost Trend
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1988.

made for 5.8 percent less if it were allowed to be
twice as heavy. More generally, if allowed to be
heavier or designed to be lighter, the cost of such a
payload would be proportional to its weight raised to
the power -0.086 (the exponent B in Builder's
model). Figure 3-2 shows how the payload cost and
the launch cost would vary with the payload weight
Designing the payload to weigh 39,000 pounds
would minimize the total cost.
Figure 3-3 shows how the payload cost and the
launch cost would vary with the payload weight if
launch cost were reduced by a factor of 3--Le., by 67
percent. It illustrates that total cost is insensitive to
weight for weights between 80,000 pounds and (at
least) 200,000 pounds. The optimal weight would be
about 150,000 pounds. Reducing the launch cost by
67 percent would reduce the total cost by only 11
percent. It should be emphasized that this is the
estimated cost reduction achievable by aI/owing
payload weight to grow without changing payload
performance. It assumes that the baseline payload
was designed to minimize total cost. If a baseline
payload was not designed to minimize total cost,
redesigning it (possibly to weigh more) could save
money even if launch costs are not reduced. If launch
costs are reduced, additional savings could be
obtained by allowing weight growth; these additional savings are the savings estimated by Builder's
model.
Figure 3-4 shows these results in a different fonn
along with results of similar analyses of other
hypothetical payloads initially weighing 39,000
pounds but costing $2 billion,· $3 billion, and $4

Figure 3-3-Cost for Hypothetical Mission If Launch
Costs Are Reduced 67 Percent
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billion. Figure 3-4a shows how these costs could be
reduced, according to Builder's model, if the
weights were allowed to grow. For each weight,
figure 3-4b shows the ("economic") launch cost at
which that weight would be optimal. These estimates predict that allowing the weight of a Titan-IVclass payload to increase by 400 percent (for
example) would reduce payload cost by an amount
that is nearly the same for a $1-billion payload as for
a $4-billion payload. The estimates also predict that
the lower the initial cost of a payload, the more the
cost per launch must be reduced to justify increasing
its weight by a large factor.
Builder's assumption about the relationship between payload weight and launch cost would lose

14 • Affordable Spacecraft: Design and Launch Alternatives

Figure 3-4-Payload Cost v. Weight Trade-offs and
EconomiC Launch Costs
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figure 3-1 very well. The cost-versus-payload curve
fitted to Delta, Titan, and Shuttle launch costs
predicted the cost of Pegasus accurately, even
though the payload capability of Pegasus is eightfold
smaller than that of the smallest vehicle (Delta) on
which the curve is based. The curve could probably
be extrapolated with comparable validity to a
payload capability of 200,000 pounds.
Similarly, Builder's assumption about the relationship between payload weight and payload cost
would also lose validity if extrapolated to extremely
heavy payloads.28 It would imply that they could be
built at a lower cost per pound than that of the bulk
structural material (e.g., aluminum) from which they
are made. However, this is not a problem for the
ranges of payload weights and costs shown in figure
3-4.
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validity if extrapolated to extremely heavy pay10ads. 27 It would imply that the average cost of
launching a pound of payload could be made as low
as desired-even lower than the cost of the fuel
required to launch a pound of payload-by building
a launch vehicle of sufficiently large payload
capability. But his assumption fits the estimates of
Pegasus, Delta, Titan, and Shuttle launch costs in

Lockheed used bottom-up analysis to estimate
how much the cost of building, launching, and
operating selected payloads could be reduced by
making them larger29 and by other measures. 30 Lockheed considered three payloads, selected to span a
range of costs, that had been built and launched and
for which design and cost data were available. The
least expensive was the Lockheed P-l1 subsatellite,
which could be modified for use as a Small Research
Satellite (SRS). The most expensive was the Orbiting Astronomical Observatory, the redesigned version of which was designated OAO-B. The other
was the Lunar Orbiter, which could be modified for
use as a Synchronous Equatorial Orbiter (SEO), four
of which could perform Earth resources observation.
Lockheed estimated how much the costs 3l of the
OAO-B and SE~ payload programs could be
reduced if the payloads were redesigned to be
launched on unmanned expendable launch vehicles
or to be launched on a (then) proposed version of the
Space Shuttle. 32 The savings estimated for the first

27If A is less than one.
28If B is less than one.
29Lockheed used parametric methods to estimate cost-versus-weight trade-offs for payload subsystems. Lockheed asswned the cost-versus-weight
trade-off curve for each subsystem was a hyperbola which. for an extremely heavy subsystem. approached a minimwn cost per pound and, at the other
extreme, approached the minimum weight achievable.
30E.g., repairing or refurbishing them in orbit or retrieving them to be repaired or refurbished on Earth.
31 Including costs of research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT &E), production, launch, operation, and replacement (or. if the Shuttle were
used, refurbishment) of satellites.

32Lockheed considered two versions.
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case were attributed to payload growth.33 However,
Lockheed did not redesign the baseline versions of
OAO-B and SE~ to minimize cost without exceeding the baseline weight, hence Lockheed attributed
to weight growth some cost reduction that should
have been attributed to improved design. The
amount of cost reduction misattributed to weight
growth cannot be determined from Lockheed's
report, so the cost reductions Lockheed attributed to
weight growth should be considered upper bounds
on cost reductions achievable by allowing weight
growth.
Figure 3-5 compares Lockheed's estimates of the
weights and the average unit costs34 of the baseline
OAO-B and SE~ with Lockheed's estimates of the
weights and costs of "low-cost" versions designed
to be launched on expendable launch vehicles. The
potential savings in fiscal year 1988 dollars would
be $10.1 million (21.3 percent) and $43 million
(15.2 percent) for SE~ and OAO-B, respectively.
The estimated weight growth required to achieve
such savings would be 170 percent and 69 percent,
respectively.
A more recent bottom-up analysis by Boeing
Aerospace Co. estimated the cost of a "typical"
payload could be reduced by a large percentage if
weight growth by a modest percentage were allowed, and that it would save money to allow such
weight growth if launch cost per pound were
reduced. 35 For example, Boeing estimated the cost
could be halved if the weight were allowed to grow
30 percent (see figure 3-6).36
Boeing actually considered a payload consisting
of an upper stage and a hypothetical spacecraft using
specific subsystem technologies and with subsystem
weights in an assumed ratio. 37 Boeing claimed the
hypothetical spacecraft was typical, implying that
similar cost reductions could be expected for other
types of spacecraft. However, some of the subsystem
technologies Boeing assumed for the spacecraft
were atypical. For example, the analysis estimated
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Figure 3-6-The Effect of Reducing Launch Cost on
the Optimal Weight and Cost of a Payload
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Boeing Aerospace Co. estimated that, if average launch cost per
pound were reduced from $3,600 per pound, it would be
economical to redesign a hypothetical payload to allow it to be
heavier by the weight-growth factor indicated and less costly by
the cost-reduction factor indicated. Boeing assumed that the
original design minimized the sum of payload and launch costs at
a launch cost of $3,600 per pound, and that the average launch
cost per pound does not depend on the payload weight.
SOURCE: Boeing Aerospace Co., 1988.

330nly part of the savings estimated for the second case was attributed to payload growth; the rest was attributed to reduced launch cost and to services
that only a reusable vehicle such as the Shunle could provide: intact abort capability, on-orbit checkout, repair, and refurbishment. Additional savings
in both cases were attributed to use of improved technology.
34Thtal program costs, excluding launch costs, divided by the number of satellites launched (6 OAO-B, 20 SEO), inflated to fiscal year 1988 dollars
by OfA.
3SEder, op. cit., footnote 8.
36Advanced Launch System (ALS) program officials have misquoted this result, saying a 50-percent cost reduction would require 70 percent weight
growth. See, e.g., Thomas M. Irby, "Status of the ALS Program," Space Systems Productivity and Manufacturing Confer::-:"-V (El Segundo, CA: The
Aerospace Corp., 1988), p. 30.
37The ratio was allowed to change when the payload was redesigned with relaxed weight constraints.
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the cost and weight of the satellite's electric power
subsystem by assuming it consisted entirely of solar
cells (which typically dominate the cost of a
satellite's power subsystem), with no batteries
(which typically dominate the weight of a satellite's
power subsystem).
Some of. the proposed cost-reducing and weightincreasing substitutions Boeing proposed--e.g., substitution ofcommercial-grade solar cells for spacecraftgrade (S-class) solar cells-would decrease payload
reliability and expected lifetime to an extent not
estimated by Boeing. Thus Boeing did not estimate
weight-versus-cost trade-offs for equal reliability;
some of the savings Boeing attributed to weight
growth should have been attributed to reduced
reliability.38 Therefore, the savings Boeing attributed to weight growth may be upper bounds for
spacecraft of the type Boeing considered.
Another recent bottom-up analysis estimated
cost-versus-weight trade-offs for some subsystems
but not for complete payloads. 39 Like earlier studies
by Lockheed40 and the Aerospace Corp. ,41 it identified payload "cost drivers"-Le., costly payload
components or testing-and recommended changes
in payload design, components, testing, or operations that might reduce space program cost. Many of
these changes would require increasing the weight of
the payload (the "fatsat" approach discussed here)
or specifying a simpler or easier mission, or fewer
missions (the "lightsat" approach discussed in
chapter 4).

A Comparison 0/ Parametric and
Bottom-Up Analyses
Estimates differ on how much cheaper payloads
could be if they were allowed to grow to a specified
weight, and how much they should grow if cost per
launch were reduced to a specified amount. One
parametric estimate by OTA predicts that a hypothetical expensive payload as heavy as a Titan IV

could launch could cost about $130 million less if
allowed to be five times as heavy. It would be
economical to d~gn the payload to be so heavy if
it could be launched for less than about $100
mi'llion. 42 Less would be saved if the baseline
payload cost were comparable to or less than the
average Titan IV launch cost, estimated here as $117
million. The only bottom-up estimate that could be
compared to these is one by Boeing, which predicts
much greater savings (at least 76 percent, or $760
million for a billion-dollar payload) but is based on
~ conceptual design for a payload that is atypical in
Important respects; moreover, the redesigned payload was allowed to use less reliable components,
and launch cost per pound was assumed to be
independent of payload weight.
OTA also derived parametric estimates to compare to detailed bottom-up estimates by Lockheed
for two spacecraft. Lockheed estimated 66 percent
greater savings for one spacecraft (SEO), and 360
pe~ent greater .savings for the other (OAO-B), but
attributed to weIght growth some savings that should
hav.e been attributed to optimization of the baseline
deSIgns. However, ~ese discrepancies are comparable to the unexplamed statistical variations often
encountered in spacecraft cost estimation. The less
d~tailed Boeing estimate, if applicable, would predIct much greater savings than predicted by OTA:
530 percent more for OAO-B, and at least 630
percent more for SEO, at the weight growth factor
proposed by Lockheed.43

ACHIEVING POTENTIAL COST
REDUCTION
Realizing most of the potential savings predicted
the~e estima~es will probably require creation of
mcenuv~s to dissuade satellite program managers
an~ desIgn~rs from adding capability, and thereby
weIght, unul launch vehicle lift margin, engine-out

?y

38Lockheeddid so and estimated~ow many satell~te~ would be required.to ~ovide comparable mission performance for 10 years. Lockheed concluded
. ed
uld be
that use of S-class components, whIch would maxmllze expected satellIte hfe and minimize the number of replacem t
cost-effective.
en s requIr ,wo
most
39Hughes Aircraft Co., op. cit., footnote 8.
4OJ:.ockheed Missiles and Space Co., op. ciL, footnote 9.
41Spacecra/t Cost Drivers Study--Final Report: Phase 1 (EI Segundo, CA: The Aerospace Corp., October 1983).
42The Advanced Launch System is intended to launch such payloads for much less.
43However, Boeing estimated that it would not be economical to seek the extreme cost reduction predicted lior SE~ un! I
h
reduced by a factor of 36.
ess aunc cost per pound were
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Box 3-A-Fatsats: The Good and Ugly, and the Bad
HEAO-During a budget crunch, NASA took steps to repackage its High-Energy Astronomical Observatory
instruments, designed for two Titan payloads, into three Atlas-Centaur payloads. This reduced launch costs by about
2 x $125K - 3 x $60K = $70K in today's dollars, by TRW's calculation. It also created extra weight margin. This
allowed designers to design the spacecraft with high safety factors (strength margin etc.), so that they could dispense
with the costly construction and testing of model and qualification spacecraft.!
Phobos 1 & 2-In July 1989, two science spacecraft, Phobos 1 and Phobos 2, were launched from the Soviet
Union toward Phobos, the larger of the two moons of Mars. Their busses were designed and built in the Soviet
Union, as were some of their instruments; other instruments were designed in Austria, France, Sweden, Switzerland,
West Germany, and several East European nations participating in Project Phobos. Some of the Soviet instruments
were designed with generous weight margins. Jochen Kissel, a West German member of the project's scientific
council, said, "We could use standard printed circuit boards rather than ultraminiaturized parts ... It made
everything cheaper and simpler."2
Nevertheless, because of greater-than-expected weight growth, some instruments were removed from one or
the other spacecraft. The two spacecraft were originally intended to carry identical suites of instruments, so that
Phobos 2 could perform all functions of Phobos 1 in case Phobos 1 failed, or vice versa.
As it happened, Phobos 1 did fail. More accurately, contact with Phobos 1 was lost late in 1988, because an
erroneous command was transmitted to Phobos 1 from the ground. To compensate for the loss, mission directors
planned to command Phobos 2 to rendezvous with Phobos rather than proceeding to the smaller Martian moon,
Deimos, as it would have had Phobos 1 succeeded. Phobos 2 lacks the radar mapper, neutron spectrometer, and solar
x-ray and ultraviolet telescopes ofPhobos 1, but carries an infrared spectrometer and a hopping lander which Phobos
11acks.3
Ironically, contact with Phobos 2 was also lost on March 27, 1989, about two weeks before the planned
encounter with Phobos was to occur (on April 9-10).4 Nevertheless, Phobos 2 gathered a significant amount of data
before this failure. This anecdote illustrates the value of generous weight margins on some instruments, the cost of
negative weight margins on other instruments and on the spacecraft as a whole, the value of redundant spacecraft,
and the risks of human errors and compound failures.
Milstar-Milstar is an advanced communications satellite being built for the Department of Defense. A few
will be built-fewer than originally planned-allowing nonrecurring program costs to be amortized over a few
satellites. Aside from this economy, Milstar appears to exemplify the antithesis of the fatsat philosophy: it is
designed to be large in order to cram it with capability, not to reduce its cost. It has had to be redesigned at least
once to reduce its estimated weight and add margin. Costly edge-of-the-art technologies have been adopted to reduce
weight, and some are so risky that additional greater-than-expected cost and weight growth could occur.
Milstar was made fatter to be better, not cheaper, and its gross weight kept growing. A subsystem designer
quipped, "Milstar is going to gross everybody out. "
!TRW, briefing. Nov. 16, 1989. See also Science. vol. 199. Feb. 24. 1978. p. 869. and Astrophysical Journal. vol. 230. JlUle 1. 1979. p. 540.
2Eric J. Lerner. "Mission to Phobos," Aerospace America. September 1988. pp. 34-39.
3Ibid., and "Phobos 1 Loss to Change Mars Mission." Aviation Week and Space Technology. Oct. 3. 1988. p. 29.
4"Soviets Lose ContactWith Phobos 2 Spacecraft." Aviation Week and Space Technology. Apr. 3, 1989. p. 22.

capability, and reliability are reduced, requmng
expensive weight reduction programs for redress.
The managers of satellite programs funded by
line-item appropriations have little incentive to

spend less than the amount appropriated. When
funding allows, spacecraft purchasers, with rare
exceptions, opt to increase performance rather than
reduce cost.

Chapter 4

Lightsats
Lightsats are satellites that are light enough to be
launched by small launch vehicles such as a Scout or
Pegasus, or others now in development. Military
lightsats could be designed for wartime deployment
or replenishment from survivable transportable launchers to support theater commanders. Civil lightsats,
and some military ones, would not require transportable launchers; they could be launched by a wider
variety of launch vehicles, including larger ones.

to shoot them down," said Dr. John Mansfield,
while Director of DARPA's Aerospace and Strategic Technology Office. 3

SPACECRAFT CONCEPTS
The first lights at developed by DARPA's Advanced Satellite Technology Program was a communications satellite, the Global Low-Orbit Message
Relay (GLOMR; see figure 4-1). Weighing only 150
lb, GLOMR was launched by the Space Shuttle on
October 31, 1985, into a 200-mile-high orbit inclined 57 by degrees.

The first Soviet and U.S. satellites were lightsats,
according to this defmition. Explorer I, the first U.S.
satellite, weighed only 31 lb but collected data that
led to the discovery of the Van Allen radiation belt.
But in another sense, the first satellites were fat-as
heavy as early launch vehicles could launch. As
larger launch vehicles were developed, larger, more
capable satellites were developed to ride them.
Nevertheless, small satellites continue to be
launched for civil and military applications that
require only simple functions.

DARPA has ordered nine more UHF communication satellites from Defense Systems, Inc., the
contractor that built the GLOMR. Seven of these,
called Microsats, will weigh approximately 50 lb
each. These satellites will be launched together into
a polar orbit 400 nautical miles high by the Pegasus
launch vehicle. Once deployed, they will spread out
around the orbit. They will carry "bent-pipe" radio
repeaters-i.e., the messages they receive will be
retransmitted instantaneously to ground stations.
The other two satellites will be larger "store/
foreward" satellites called MACSATs (for MultipleAccess Communication SATellite). They will weigh
about 150 lb each and will be launched together on
a Scout launch vehicle. They will store messages
received from ground stations and forward (or
"dump") them when within range of the ground
stations to which the messages are addressed. The
bent-pipe satellites and the first store/foreward
satellites will cost DARPA about $8 million excluding launch costs.

Interest in lightsats has grown recently, 1 partly in
anticipation of new rockets designed to launch them
at low cost, and, in the case of military lightsats,
because of a desire for a survivable means of
launching satellites--e.g., transportable launch vehicles too small to launch large satellites. 2
A few years ago the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) began to examine
lightsats, initially to demonstrate the ability of
simple and inexpensive satellites to perform simple
but useful tasks, and, more recently, to demonstrate
the utility of satellites small enough to be launched
from transportable launchers to support theater
commanders during a war. DARPA is considering
concepts for several types oflightsats-for communications, navigation, radar mapping, and targeting. The
Army, Navy, or Air Force may choose to procure
similar lightsats for operational use. They would be
designed to be affordable as well as small, because
many might be needed for replenishment after
attrition. "With lights at, we can undoubtedly put up
satellites for less money than it will cost the Soviets

Amateur ("ham") radio operators have built a
series of small satellites carrying radio beacons or
repeaters, the first of which, OSCAR I, was launched
in 1961. Since 1969, the nonprofit Radio Amateur
Satellite Corp. (AMSAT) and its sister organizations
worldwide4 have built or designed several of these
for scientific, educational, humanitarian, and recreational use by hams. AMSAT, which has only one
paid employee, is now building four 22-pound

1See• e.g.• A.E. Fuhs and M.R. Mosier. "A Niche for Lightweight Satellites." Aerospace America. April 1988. pp. 14-16.• and Theresa M. Foley.
"U.S. Will Increase Lightsat Launch Rate to Demonstrate Military. Scientific Uses." Aviation Week and Space Technology. Sept. 26. 1988. pp. 19-20.
2There is no consensus on whether this is the best approach to assuring continued mission performance in wartime.

3Quoted by Jatnes W. Rawles. "LlGHTSAT: All Systems Are Go." Defense Electronics. vol. 20, No.5, May 1988. p. 64 fT.
4AMSAT-North America has sister organizations in Argentina. Australia. Brazil, Britain. Germany. Italy. Japan. Mexico. and the Netherlands. The
Soviet Union has also launched satellites for atnateur radio operators.
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Figure 4-1-The Global low-Orbit Message Relay
(GLOMR) Satellite

named Webersat, will carry, in addition to its packet
radio repeater, a low-resolution color TV camera
designed at the Center for Aerospace Technology at
Weber State College in Logan, UT. The fourth
satellite, Digital Orbiting Voice Encoder (DOVE),
was built for BRAMSAT (AMSAT-Brazil). It will
carry a digital voice synthesizer to generate voice
messages that can be received by students using
inexpensive "scanner" radios.6
AMSAT contracted with Arianespace to launch
these four satellites together for $100,000. The
Ariane 4 launch vehicle will also deploy the
UoSAT-D and UoSAT-E amateur-radio satellites
built at the University of Surrey in England in
addition to the four Microsats and its primary
payload, the SPOT 2 photomapping satellite. 7 The
launch, originally scheduled for June 1989, has been
postponed until January 1990, at the earliest.

SOURCE: Department of Defense.

(lO-kilogram) communications satellites called Microsats5 (figure 4-2). (These Microsats are unrelated
to the above-mentioned Microsats developed for
DARPA and to the "microspacecraft" discussed in
the next part of this report.) All four satellites are
designed to receive, store, and forward digital
messages using a technique called packet communications. All four use a standard bus, the Microsat
bus. One of the satellites, called PACSAT, is being
built for AMSAT. An almost identical satellite
called LUSAT is being built for a sister organization,
AMSAT-LU, in Argentina. A third satellite, nick-

Microsats are among the smallest communications satellites ever built. They are lightsats, because
they are designed to perform relatively simple
functions. But they are also fatsats, because they are
heavier and larger than they would be if built by
methods usually used for more conventional (and
more expensive) satellites. Assembly of some Microsat subsystems is literally a cottage industry.
Although some printed circuits are being built for
Microsats by a contractor using high-tech methods,
others are being built in the homes of Amateur radio
operators allover the country. When they volunteer
to assemble printed circuits, AMSAT sends them the
instructions.

CONCEPTS FOR PHASED

ARRAYS OF SPACECRAFT
Groups of small satellites could collectively
provide communications or radar capabilities that
could otherwise be provided only by a large satellite.
To do so they would have to operate coherently as
elements of a phased array: all satellites must relay
the signals they receive to a satellite or ground
station that can combine them in a way that depends
on the relative positions of the satellites, which must
be measured extremely accurately. When transmitting, the satellites must all transmit the same signal,

SSee courtney Duncan. "The AMSAT-NA Microsats." 73 Amateur Radio. May 1989. pp. 83-84. and Doug Loughmiller and Bob McGwier.
"Microsat: The Next Generation of OSCAR Satellites-Part 1." QST. May 1989, pp. 37-40.
6'J'he digital voice synthesizer is similar to the DIGITALKER developed at the University of Surrey in England for use on the UoSAT-OSCAR-9
and UoSAT- OSCAR-II amateur-radio satellites built there.
7JeffW. Ward, "Experimental OSCARs," QST, May 1989, p. 62 ff.
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Figure 4-2-Mlcrosat: A 22-lb Communications satellite for Amateur ("Ham") Radio Operators

(I) Flight model beside Leonid Labutin. UA3CR.
(r) Close-up view. (Copyright Radio Amateur Satellite Corp.)
Photos: Andrew C. MacAllister. WA5ZIB.

but each satellite must delay its transmission by a
period that depends on its relative position.
The Air Force has considered "placing large
phased arrays in space with major components of the
arrays not rigidly connected to each other" (see
figure 4-3), because' 'If we can achieve coherence
among these components, phased arrays can be
spread out over very large volumes in space, giving
them an unprecedented degree of survivability. It
therefore may be possible to create a phased-array
device (e.g., a space-based radar) that we can place
into space and enhance simply by adding more
relatively inexpensive elements whenever the threat
increases and budget pressures permit.' '8 If small
enough, each element could be launched by a small
launch vehicle.
If a large radar or communications satellite were
divided into several modules. "crosslink" equipment for communications among the modules would
have to be provided, which would add some weight
and cost. Aside from this, historical cost data

indicate that a communications mISSIOn payload
might cost less if divided into several smaller
payloads of equal aggregate weight and power.9 The
same might be true of radar equipment. Each module
would need its own bus, but the cost data also
indicate that several small busses would probably
cost less, or no more, than a single bus of equal
aggregate weight. 1O Learning and production-rate
effects could make the small modules and busses
even less expensive. Economies of scale in launching might make it economical to launch as many as
possible on a large launch vehicle, but they could be
launched individually on small launch vehicles if
desired--e.g., in wartime, if peacetime launch facilities have been damaged.
Coherent operation of several satellites requires
relative positions to be measured with errors no
greater than a fraction of a wavelength of the
radiation to be sensed or transmitted. The accuracy
required for coherent operation of several satellites
as a microwave radar or radiotelescope has already
been demonstrated. I I Coherent operation of several

8Headquaners. Air Force Systems Command, Project Forecast II Executive Summary (Andrews Air Force Base, MD: Headquarters, Air Force
Systems Command, undated). This concept is described in greater detail in the classified final report, AFSC-TR-86-008; see pp. PS-30.01 to PS-30.19
of Annex D of vol. IV. which authorized readers may request from the Defense Technical Information Center (accession number AD-C039 642).
9p. Hillebrandt et al .• Space Division Unmanned Space Vehicle Cost Model Sixth Edition. SD TR-88-97 (Los Angeles AFB. CA: Headquarters. Space
Systems Division, U.S. Air Force Systems Command. November 1988); distribution limited to U.S. Government agencies only.
lOibid.
llM.A. Dornhein. "TORS, Ground Antennas Link for Radio Astronomy Observations," Aviation Week and Space Technology. Dec. 1. 19116. pp.
32-33.
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Figure 4-3-Sparse Array of Satellites Could Provide
Detailed Radar Maps (Artist's Concept)

has proposed a less ambitious phased-array radiotelescope that could be begun today: an Orbiting
Low-Frequency Array of 6 or 7 satellites in a
formation 200 kIn across (see figure 4-4). It could
map astronomical sources of radio signals with
wavelengths longer than 15 meters; such signals
cannot penetrate the Earth's ionosphere to reach
ground-based radiotelescopes. The angular resolution of the proposed array could be comparable to
that of a dish antenna 200 km across. JPL estimates
that each satellite would cost about $1.5 million and
weigh less than 90 kg (200 lb) if cy lindrical, or 45 kg
(100 lb) if spherical. 14 They must be launched to a
circular orbit at least 10,000 kIn high, so the
equivalent weight to low orbit would be about 170
lb for the spherical satellite.

LAUNCH REQUIREMENTS

SOURCE: U.S. Air Force.

satellites as a ladar or optical telescope is beyond the
state of the art. However, someday it may be feasible
to launch several telescope modules, each smaller
than the Hubble Space Telescope, and assemble
them in space (or allow them to assemble themselves) into a rigidly connected phased array12 that
would operate as an optical telescope with better
light-collecting capability and resolution than the
Hubble Space Telescope. If technology advances
further, two or more such arrays, not rigidly connected to one another, could operate coherently to
further increase light-collecting capability and, especially, resolution.13
A scientist at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)
of the California Institute of Technology (CalTech)

Operational launchers for military lightsats must
meet several requirements, the most distinctive
being survivability in high-intensity (if not nuclear)
conflict. Such survivability is required of V.S.
strategic and theater missile launchers, and operational lights at launchers might adopt some of their
features. Like the rail-mobile launcher for the Soviet
SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the
similar launcher being developed for V.S. Peacekeeper
(M-X) ICBMs, and the Hard Mobile Launcher being
developed for the Small ICBM ("Midgetman"),
lights at launchers could pursue survivability
through mobility. They could also employ concealment, as do the Pershing 2 launcher and submarines
(e.g. Trident) that launch ballistic missiles.
Operational military lights at launchers would
probably be required to launch on short notice and to
sustain higher launch rates than typical space launch
facilities do. On the other hand, lightsat launch
vehicles would be useful with less lift capability than
most launch vehicles have, although DARPA has
said the Scout launch vehicle lifts too little to be
useful as an interim launch vehicle for launching
developmentallightsats, and the Scout does not have
the survivability and launch rate desired for wartime
use. The Pegasus launch vehicle may provide an
innovative means of improving launch flexibility
and survivability.

12Such as the proposed Coherent System of Modular Imaging Collectors (COSMIC) described by the National Research Council in Space Technology

to Meet Future Needs (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1987), p. 39.

l3lbid.
14Tom Kuiper. "Sub-millimeter Waves," in NASNQAST & SDIO/IST, Micro Spacecraft/or Space Science Workshop-presentations. California
Institute of Tcclmo1ogy Jet Propulsion Laboratory, July 6-7, 1988; pp. 136-142.
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Figure 4-4-Orblting Low-Frequency Array of Radioastronomy Satellites (Artist's Concept)

1 -.
"1
.
1
.
. .

.

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

"

.

"

100 KM ------------II~~I

SOURCE: California Institute of Technology, Jet Propulsion Laboratory.

Civil lightsats and developmental military
lightsats would not require transportable launchers.

vehicles larger than the Scout. If they are small
enough, they could be launched by the Scout.

LAUNCH SYSTEM OPTIONS

Air-Launched Vehicles

Existing Launch Vehicles
Civil lightsats, or developmental military lightsats.
could be launched-alone or co-manifested with
other payloads-on currently operational launch

The communications satellites now being developed by DARPA are very light; several can be
launched on the Pegasus air-launched vehicle (ALV).
The Pegasus ALV is being developed by Orbital
Sciences Corp. (OSC) and Hercules Aerospace
Corp. as a $50 million privately funded joint
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Figure 4-5-Pegasus Launch

The Pegasus air-launched vehicle is released from a modified B-52 aircraft operated by NASA's Dryden Flight Research Facility (artist's
concept).
SOURCE: Orbital Sciences Corp.

venture. DARPA will pay OSC $6.3 million to
provide the launch vehicle for a government demonstration launch. This price includes neither the cost
of using NASA's B-52 as an ALV carrier (see figure
4-5) nor the cost of safety support from the Air
Force's Western Test Range. Pegasus is expected to
be able to launch a 335-kg (738-lb) payload into an
orbit 500 km (270 nmi) high and inclined 25 degrees,
or a 244-kg (537-lb) payload into a polar orbit 500
km high (see figure 4-6).
DARPA originally intended to launch the Microsats on the first Pegasus launch, but has decided to
launch them on the second launch, perhaps late in
1989. On its first flight, now scheduled for January
1990, Pegasus will carry:

1. a 150-lb Navy communication satellite,
2. a NASA scientific experiment payload, and

3. instrumentation to evaluate the performance of
the ALV.
DARPA's contract has four launch options remaining, and OSC has offered to add six additional
launch options to the contract.
OSC and Hercules also expect Pegasus can launch
lightsats into geostationary orbit; they recently
signed an agreement with Ball Aerospace to launch
two BGS-IOO Ball geostationary satellites in late
1990 or early 1991. OSC estimates each launch will
, cost between $6 million and $8 million, and that
each of the satellites, which will weigh about 400 lb
and carry a 400-watt single-channel transponder,
will cost between $5 million and $8 million. OSC
estimates each mission (satellite, launch, and support) will cost about $20 million. The satellite design
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Figure 4-6-Projected Performance of Pegasus: Payload v. Orbital Altitude and Inclination
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is modular; Ball is developing larger versions with
more transponders or more power per transponder. IS

also developing a commercial version of the SSLV,
called Taurus.

Standard Small Launch Vehicle

Other small launch vehicles have been developed
or proposed by companies that performed Phase 1
SSLV studies for DARPA. Space Services, Inc.
(SSI) developed a launch vehicle called Conestoga,
which uses clustered Castor solid rocket motors. The
ftrst Conestoga was successful on a sub-orbital
flight, but the second failed shortly after launch on
November 15, 1989. LTV Aerospace, which produces the Scout, could produce an upgraded version.
Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. proposed a launch
vehicle that would use the fust- and second-stage
motors from Poseidon C3 fleet ballistic missiles and
Morton Thiokol Star 48 motors for the third stage.
Lockheed estimated that the vehicle could be
available in two years and could launch a 770-lb

Last year, DARPA issued a Request for Proposals
to develop a transportable ground-launched Standard Small Launch Vehicle (SSLV) capable of
launching 1,000 lb of payload to a polar orbit 400
nmi high. DARPA recently awarded a contract to
Space Data Corp. (a subsidiary of OSC) for development, one launch (from Vandenberg Air Force Base
in the fall of 1991), and options for four more. The
first stage of the vehicle proposed by Space Data
Corp. will use a solid rocket motor developed for the
Peacekeeper ICBM by Morton Thiokol. The second,
third, and fourth stages will be the ftrst, second, and
third stages of Pegasus, without the wings. OSC is

IS' 'Pegasus, Ball to Launch CommWlication Satellites Into Geosynchronous Orbit," Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 12, 1989, p. 64, and
Military Space, June 19, 1989, p. 8.
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payload from a land-based launcher to a 250-mile
high orbit inclined 28 degrees. 16

Other Options
The U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) is
developing a concept for a sea-launch system to
launch a partially submerged launch vehicle from a
platform towed out to sea. 17 This system, called
SEALAR (SEA Launch And Recovery) might
provide the survivability required by lightsats.
Sea-launch systems have been tested, to different
degrees, by the U.S. Navy (Project Hydra), Truax
Engineering18 (SEA DRAGON, SUBCALffiUR),
and Starstruck (now American Rocket Co.). DARPA
is not known to be considering a sea-launch system
for its Advanced Satellite Technology Program, but
such a system might prove attractive to the Navy in
the future.
Storage, shipment, and mobile basing of small
launch vehicles could be made safer by using hybrid
rocket motors-rocket motors that use liquid oxygen to burn solid fuel, which can be inert (nonexplosive). American Rocket Co. (AMROC) of Camarillo, CA, has developed a throttleable, restartable,
70,000-lb thrust hybrid rocket motor, the H-500. On
its first launch attempt (October 5,1989), the motor
failed and the prototype sounding rocket it was to
power collapsed and burned at Vandenberg Air
Force Base, CA. It is noteworthy that it did not
explode, and did very little damage to the pad.

not specifically designing the launch vehicle for
survivable basing (although this is not precluded)
and has not entered DARPA's SSLV competition.
Before the sounding rocket failure, AMROC expected a first launch late in 1990.
AMROC is also developing a larger hybrid motor
for a larger launch vehicle, as well as a smaller
hybrid motor for various applications, possibly
including use on projectiles launched from electromagnetic launchers (discussed below).
General Technology Systems (GTS) is developing a small launch vehicle called LittLEO to launch
lightsats. It is expected to be able to launch almost
a tonne (2,200 lb) of payload into a polar orbit 300
kilometers (162 nautical miles) high. First launch is
planned for 1992, probahly from Andoya, Norway.
GTS quotes a price of nine million pounds sterling
per launch, which is equivalent to roughly $6,400
per pound to LEO.19
E'Prlme Aerospace Corp. (EPAC) is developing
a series of launch vehicles for launching payloads
weighing from 1,000 to 20,000 lb into LEO and up
to 8,000 lb into geostationary Earth orbit (GEO).
EPAC quotes a prices of $12 million per launch for
the smallest launch vehicle and $80 million for the
largest. 2o EPAC plans to launch from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, FL, and from Vandenberg Air
Force Base, CA. A first launch is planned for 1992.

The sounding rocket, a prototype of AMROC's
planned Industrial Research Rocket, carried a payload designed by AMROC for a Strategic Defense
Initiative experiment and a prototype reentry vehicle
developed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Space Systems Laboratory. The reentry vehicle was to deploy an umbrella-like structure
made of space-suit material and decelerate to a soft
landing in the Pacific Ocean, where it was to be
recovered.

The Soviet Union is developing a launch vehicle
called "Start" for launching lightsats. Start would
use guidance and propulsion systems developed for
the SS-20 ballistic missile and could be launched
from a mobile launcher, carrying 300-lb payloads to
orbits 500 km high. Space Commerce Corp., in
Houston, is seeking customers for Technopribor,
which is developing Start, and quoting a price of
about $5 million to $6 million per launch. Technopribor estimates a test launch could be conducted
in 1991.

AMROC is developing a larger sounding rocket
and an even larger Industrial Launch Vehicle, the
largest version of which is being designed to launch
a 4,000-lb payload into low Earth orbit. AMROC is

Lightsats can also be launched as "piggyback"
payloads on launch vehicles carrying larger primary
payloads. Many U.S. and foreign launch vehicles
have done this for years. Arianespace has developed

16"Lockheed Will Develop Small Military Booster Using Poseidon C3 Hardware," Aviation Week and Space Technology, Sept. 26, 1988, p. 18.
11NRL, Naval Center for Space Technology, briefing for OTA staff, Feb. 17, 1989.
18Capt. Roben C. Truax, USN (ret.), "Commercial View on Launch Vehicles," Space Systems Productivity and Manl.ifacturing Conference IV (EI
Segundo, CA: Aerospace Corp., Aug. 11-12, 1987); pp. 55-69.
191an Parker, "Getting There Cheaply," Space, vol. 5, No.4, July-August 1989, pp. 45-48.
lOIbid.
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procedures to do so routinely with the Ariane 4
launch vehicle, which, as noted above, is scheduled
to launch six amateur-radio satellites in addition to
the SPOT 2 photomapping satellite on January 19,
1990. General Dynamics is planning to offer a
similar service using its commercial Atlas launch
vehicle, which could launch, in addition to a primary
payload, one 3,000-lb satellite or several smaller
lightsats to LEO, or a 2,000-lb payload to geostationary transfer orbit. 21 This service could be offered
in late 1991 for about $6,000 per pound to LEO; the
primary payload owner may reserve the right to
approve the price offered. 22
Someday, small lightsats might be launched on
laser-powered rockets (discussed below). Lightsats
could also be launched on vehicles proposed for
launching larger payloads or crews-e.g., the Advanced Launch System, the Advanced Manned
Launch System, and NASP-derived vehicles. 23 Of
these, only National Aero-Space Plane (NASP)derived vehicles (NDVs) are intended to provide a
survivable capability for wartime launch.

ISSUES
Are lightsats the most economical answer to the
problem of satellite vulnerability? Replenishing
satellites in wartime is only one of several partial
solutions; others include hardening satellites and
stockpiling spare satellites in orbit during peacetime,24 as well as arms control, actively defending
satellites, and reducing reliance on satellites for
support of military operations. 25
What military requirements could lightsats satisfy? An Air Force officer responsible for space
system planning said, "The challenge to the small

satellite community has been to get out of the mold
of a solution looking for a problem; that is, what
missions will a small satellite support. "26 According
to the previous Secretary of the Air Force, "The
decision on whether a system is 'small' depends on
such things as orbit, mission, requirements, and
technology capabilities. When these factors properly
converge, we have built Smallsats . . . . What we
want are a realistic set of requirements and concepts
for smaller systems.' '27 Several concepts have
already been proposed, the most grandiose of which
are being considered by the Strategic Defense
Initiati ve Organization: "Brilliant Pebbles" orlarger
space-based missile interceptors, "Brilliant Eyes"
(space-based space-surveillance satellites that would
demonstrate Brilliant Pebbles technology-see box
4-A), decoys for Brilliant Pebbles, and "Small
Dumb Boosters" (orbital transfer stages with which
Brilliant Pebbles could rendezvous and mate).
Could lights at technology and launch vehicles
benefit civil applications? They already have. For
example, for two decades amateur radio operators
have built and used lightsats for recreational, educational, and public-service communications. Conceivably, networks of tens or hundreds of lightsats
could provide continuous global communications or
navigation services commercially. There is some
commercial interest in concepts. that would require
only a few lightsats. 28 29
Since Sputnik I and Explorer I, science has
benefitted from lightsats and will continue to
benefit-more so if launch costs are reduced.
Medium-sized multi-mission remote-sensing satellites have used some instruments, such as the
Scanning Multichannel Microwave Radiometer on
Seasat-l,30 that are light enough to be mated to a

21Th reach geostationary orbit (GEO) from geostationary transfer orbit (GTO). the payload must have an orbital transfer stage.
22Ian Parker. op. cit .. footnote 19.
23See U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Round Trip to Orbit: Human Space!light Alternatives. OTA-ISC-419 (Washington. DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office. August 1989).
24See. for example. the speech that the Honorable Edward C. Aldridge. Jr.. Secretary ofthe Air Force. prepared for a luncheon at the Aviation Club.
Crystal City. VA. Sept. 15. 1988. and Col. Charles Heimach. USAF. Speech to Second Annual AIAMJSU Conference on Small Satellites. Utah State
University. Logan. UT, September 1988.
25See U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Antisatellite Weapons. Countermeasures, and Arms Control. OTA-ISC-281 (Washington.
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. September 1985); reprinted in Office of Technology Assessment. Strategic Defenses (Princeton. NJ: Princeton
University Press. 1986).
26Col. Charles Heirnach. USAF. op. cit.. footnote 24.
27Hon. Edward C. Aldridge. Jr.. op. cit .. footnote 24.
28Fuhs and Mosier. op. cit.. footnote 1.
29'fhe Center for Innovative Technology of the Commonwealth of Virginia has commissioned economists at George Mason University to assess
potential markets for small satellites. This study is nearing completion.
30A.R. Hibbs and W.S. Wilson. "Satellites Map the Oceans." IEEE Spectrum. October 1983. pp. 46-53.
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Box 4-A-Brilliant Eyes?
Lawrence Livennore National Laboratory (LLNL) is developing a new class of electronic high-resolution
wide-angle TV cameras that, from an altitude of 1,000 km (610 mi), could image a land area the size of the state
of Virginia and show individual buildings. The first prototype camera, completed in 1987, has optics that are about
1 ft in diameter and 16 in long, excluding electronics. With improved electro-optical components, its resolution
would be comparable to or slightly better than that of the French SPOT satellite (about 10 m) from:. a comparable
altitude (832 km). At a lower altitude it could show greater detail but would have a smaller field of view. On Earth,
it could be used as a telescopic TV camera to record the tracks of meteors and low-altitude satellites against the
night-time sky.
SPOT Imagery of the Pentagon and
LLNL has also developed a preliminary
the White House
design for a miniature version of this camera
Lightsats Could Produce Comparable Imagery
compact enough for use as a satellite navigation system. The system is designed to get
periodic position updates by viewing many
stars at the same time. The total mass of the
system is expected to be less than 250 grams
(about half a pound). LLNL expects that "this
[wide-field-of-view] system, with its combination of high resolution and high light collection capability, will also find applications in
SOURCE: U.S. Geodetic Survey.
robot vision and smart munitions. "I
ILLNL. EfU!rgy and Technology Review. July-August 1988. pp. 88-89.

lights at bus to become a lights at for meteorology and
oceanography. Arrays of lightsats could someday
use interferometric (phased-array) and aperturesynthesis techniques to provide high-resolution
radar or microwave imagery for Earth-resources

mapping or "mediasat" applications. 3 ! This might
be more economical than using a large, monolithic
satellite; predicting an arrays' relative economy
would require comparing cost estimates based on
detailed designs.

31See U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Commercial Newsgathering From Space. OTA-TM-ISC-40 (Springfield. VA: National
Technical Information Service. May 1987).
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Microspacecraft
the accelerations to which electromagnetic launch
would subject them.

Microspacecraft would be satellites or deep-space
probes weighing no more than about 10 kilograms
(22 pounds).l Tens or hundreds could be used to
measure magnetism, gravity, or solar wind at widely
separated points simultaneously. A swarm of different microspacecraft could obtain detailed radio
images of galaxies, while others could be used for
communications, gamma-ray astronomy, or planetary photoreconnaissance.

Placed in different orbits or trajectories, they
could trade off field of 'View for resolution, or vice
versa For example, one MOC microspacecraft in a
polar orbit about Mars could serve as a Martian
weather satellite, providing two-color images with a
resolution of 5 to 10 kilometers (km)-sufficient to
resolve Martian clouds. A similar MOC micros pacecraft in a lower orbit could serve as a mapper,
providing two-color images of a smaller field of
view with better resolution-l00 meters (m). In time
it could map the entire planet. A similar MOC
microspacecraft in an even lower orbit about the
Moon could provide a two-color global map of the
Moon with 10m resolution. Existing global maps of
the Moon currently show no features smaller than
several hundred meters.

They would not require development of new
launch systems; they could be launched like buckshot on existing small launch vehicles. However, if
there were a demand for launching thousands per
year, it might be cheaper to launch them on
laser-powered rockets (see figure 5-1), if these prove
feasible.
Extremely rugged microspacecraft, constructed
like the Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile
(LEAP) being developed for the Strategic Defense
Initiative,2 could be launched to orbit by an electromagnetic launcher (railgun or coilgun) or a ram
cannon. An electromagnetic launcher in orbit could
launch them toward outer planets at muzzle velocities that would allow them to reach their destinations
and return data to Earth within a few years. This
might allow a graduate student to design a mission
and then receive mission data in time to use it in a
Ph.D. dissertation.

LAUNCH SYSTEM OPTIONS
New, specialized launch systems need not be
developed to launch microspacecraft, because they
could be launched on existing launch vehicles-by
the dozens, if appropriate. However, some proposed
unconventional launch systems might prove to be
better or cheaper than conventional launch vehicles
for launching microspacecraft.
One example of such a system is a laser-powered
rocket that would use a laser beam, instead of
combustion, to heat the propellant, which could be
inert (Le., nonreactive). If feasibility is proven, a
lO-megawatt (MW) laser may be able to launch a
I-kg payload of one or more micro spacecraft; a
gigawatt laser might launch a I-tonne (t) payload
consisting of several microspacecraft or a larger
spacecraft.

SPACECRAFT CONCEPTS
Several concepts for microspacecraft have been
proposed. One example is the Mars Observer
Camera (MOC) microspacecraft proposed by the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory at the California Institute of
Technology (CalTech). It would be a generic imaging microspacecraft; dozens could be launched on
each of several missions-to the Moon, the planets,
their moons, cornets, and asteroids. A MOC microspacecraft would be shaped like an oversized hockey
puck, about 15 centimeters (cm) in diameter and 4
cm thick (see figure 5-2). It would weigh about 800
grams (g). A version could be designed to withstand

The smallness of microspacecraft has another
potential advantage: some microspacecraft could be
built to withstand high accelerations comparable to
those endured by cannon-launched guided projectiles such as Copperhead. 3 Such "g-hardened"

lSee Ross M. Jones. "Coffee-can-sized spacecraft." Aerospace Am£rica. October 1988. pp. 36-38. and "Think small-in large nwnbers,"
Aerospace America. October 1989. pp. 14-17.
2See U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. SDJ: Technology. Survivability, and Software, OTA-ISC-353 (Washington. DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, May 1988). pp. 120-121.
3The U.S. Army's M712 Copperhead cannon-launched guided projectile is an artillery shell fired from a 155mm howitzer. It has a sensor and
electronics for detecting a spot of laser light on a target illwninated by a low-power, pulse-coded, target-designating laser aimed by a soldier or pilot.
When Copperhead detects such a spot. it steers toward it using fins deployed after launch. Copperhead rounds cost about $35,000 each.
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Figure 5-1-Laser-Powered Rockets
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A simple laser-powered rocket would have four parts: the
propellant (a block of plastic, metal, or ice), the payload,
the payload fairing (nose cone), and a base plate to which
the propellant is bonded and the payload and fairing are
attached. A large laser built on a mountain would beam
power to the rocket, vaporizing the propellant and
thereby producing thrust perpendicular to the surface of
the propellant.
The figure at left illustrates operation of the system
shortly after launch, when the rocket ascends vertically.
After the rocket rises above the densest part of the
atmosphere, the laser beam would be aimed off-center to
produce thrust asymmetrically, causing the rocket to pitch
(tilt) over, as shown above left. The rocket then begins to
accelerate downrange while ascending. When the rocket
reaches orbital altitude, it continues to accelerate
horizontally, as shown above, until orbital velocity is
attained.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1989.

microspacecraft could be launched by "direct
launch" systems4 such as railguns,5 coilguns,6 and

ram cannons.7 In the near term, microspacecraft
could be launched by chemical rockets, such as

4S0 called because the projectiles, which would enclose and protect the microspacecraft (or a mission payload), would require no further propulsion
after they leave the muzzle of the launch system, if launched into solar orbit or an interplanetary trajectory. A projectile would require a small rocket
motor or some other kind of motor to enter Earth orbit.
SMiles R. Palmer and Ali E. Dabiri, "Electromagnetic Space Launch: A Re-Evaluation in Light of Current Technology and Launch Needs and
Feasibility of a Near-Term Demonstration," IEEE Transactions on Magnetics, vol. MAG-25, No. I, January 1989, p. 393ff.

6Henry Kolm and Peter Mongeau, "Basic Principles of Coaxial Launch Teclmology ," IEEE Transactions on Magnetics, vol. MAG-20, No.2, March
1984, pp. 227-230.
7A.P. Bruckner and A. Henzberg, "A Ram Accelerator System for Direct Launch of Space Cargo," Paper No.IAF-87-211, presented at the 38th
Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, Brighton, England, Oct 10-17,1987.
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Figure 5-2-Mars Observer Camera Mlcrospacecraft
Design Cutaway View-Actual Size

Earth-to-orbit transportation. For brevity, we discuss
only two unconventional launch technologies here:
railguns and two-pulse laser-supported-detonation
(LSD) thrusters, which are the simplest of several
proposed laser-powered rockets. We discuss only
their application to Earth-to-orbit transportation
here, although both are also applicable to in-space
transportation. 9 In fact, orbital transfer or reboost of
low-altitude satellites could be done with much
smaller lasers than would be required for launching
projectiles from Earth to orbit. lO
Direct launch systems would subject payloads to
high accelerations. For a specified muzzle velocity,
the barrel length of any type of direct-launch system
must grow as the reciprocal of acceleration. To
achieve a muzzle velocity of 8 kilometers per second
with an acceleration of 1,000 gs,ll a direct-launch
system must have a barrel more than 3 km long. It
would be impractical for a launcher to be much
longer, or to subject a payload to correspondingly
lower acceleration.

SOURCE: Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 1988.

Scout and Pegasus, that are designed to launch
payloads of a few hundred kilograms for a fraction
of the cost of launching them on larger launch
vehicles.
In the remainder of this section we focus on
unconventional launch technologies. A surprisingly
large number of them have been proposed; one
recent review8 lists 60 propulsion technologies-in
addition to conventional chemical rocket technologythat are potentially applicable to space transportation. About half are applicable to Earth-to-orbit
transportation; most are applicable to in-space
transportation (e.g., orbital transfer or escape),
which demands less thrust and power than does

To launch a projectile vertically at an acceleration
of 1,000 gs, the projectile must be subjected to a
force 1,001 times its weight. 12 Hence exotic design,
fabrication, and testing processes are requiredespecially for electronic and optical componentsand there are constraints on the shape of the
projectile, and, in practice, limits on its size.
Proposed projectiles have weights ranging from a
few kilograms to a tonne. They could carry payloads
such as fuel, food, water, structural components for
space assembly, and specially designed electronic
and optical systems such as those used in the Army's
Copperhead cannon-launched guided projectile and
SADARM cannon-launched sensor-fuzed weapon,
and the Lightweight Exo-Atmospheric Projectile
being developed for the SOL

8Dani Eder, "Technological Progress and Space Development," draft, Apr. 30,1989.
9See, e.g., Ross M. Jones, "Electromagnetically Launched Micro Spacecraft for Space Science Missions," AIAA paper 88-0068, Jan. 11, 1988, and
Arthur Kantrowitz, "Laser Propulsion to Earth Orbit: Has Its Time Come?" J.T. Kare (ed.). Proceedings SDIOIDARPA Workshop on Laser Propulsion,
CONF-860778 (Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, July 7-18, 1986), vol. 2, pp. 1-12.
IOKantrowitz,op. cit., footnote 9, and P.K. Chapman, "Strategic Defense Applications of Ground-Based Laser Propulsion," J.T. Kare (ed.), op. cit.,
footnote 9.
liThe g (not to be confused with the gram, which is also abbreviated as "g' ') is a unit of acceleration. At an acceleration of 1 g, an object's velocity
increases by 9.8 m (32 ft) per second per second.
121f a projectile near the ground were dropped. i.e., subjected to no force, it would accelerate downward; its downward velocity would increase by
9.8 m per second each second. If sitting on the ground, it would be subjected to a force equal to its weight; this keeps it from falling into the ground-it
accelerates at zero gs. If subjected to a force twice its weight. it would accelerate upward at 9.8 m per second per second. If subjected to a force thrice
its weight, it would accelerate upward at 19.6 m per second per second, and so on.

32 • Affordable Spacecraft: Design and Launch Alternatives

In a previous report, OTA described two proposed
direct launch systems: ram cannons and coilguns. I3
Coilguns could have important advantages over
railguns, which are simpler and more familiar
electromagnetic launchers (EMLs). For example,
coilguns can be designed so that the projectile does
not contact the barrel, avoiding barrel erosion, and
they can be scaled to launch large masses efficiently
at high velocities. Until recently, railguns were
expected to be very inefficient at launching multikilogram projectiles at the muzzle velocities (more
than eight kilometers per second) required to reach
orbit with minimal assistance from rockets. Low
efficiency would cause barrel heating and melting,
as well as a high electric bill. However, in recent
tests, railguns demonstrated unexpectedly high efficiencies in accelerating small projectiles to muzzle
velocities of 3 to 4 km per second,I4 raising hopes
that they might be able to accelerate half-tonne
projectiles to more than 8 km per second.
Another cause for increased interest in railguns
for direct launch is the realization that ordinary
automobile batteries could be used for energy
storage and would cost much less than alternatives
previously considered. Automobile batteries could
also power coilguns.
The Air Force recently decided to demonstrate
suborbital launching of a microspacecraft using a
railgun at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, after
augmenting its battery power system and adding a
barrel with a 30-cm bore, similar to one used
recently at Maxwell Laboratories. According to one
estimate, the upgraded gun could launch 5 to 10 kg
at 4 km per second three years from program start for
only about $10 million. A I-kg projectile launched
at 3 km per second with a I-kg sabot is expected to
reach an altitude of 200 km if the projectile's nosetip
is allowed to ablate, or 400 km if the nosetip is
cooled by transpiration. IS

Proponents predict that a prototype operational
EML capable of launching 500-kg projectiles each
carrying about 250 kg of pay load could be developed
in about six more years for an additional $900
million to $6 billion, including $50 million to $5
billion for development of vehicles and tracking
technology.I617
If produced and launched at a rate of 10,000 per
year, projectiles (less payloads) would cost as little
as $1,000 per kg according to one estimate, but over
60 times this, according to another estimate. An
EML projectile would require (besides its mission
payload) guidance, navigation, and control systems,
as well as a rocket kick motor to inject it into Earth
orbit. I8 Just as allowing a payload of specified
function to be larger allows it to be cheaper,
miniaturizing it makes it more costly, and ghardening it would make it still more costly. On the
other hand, if a mission required many projectiles,
high-rate production and learning effects could
reduce unit costs. Other launch costs might be as low
as $50 per kg at this rate.
If batteries are used, the limit would be about
10,000 launches (2,500 t) per year. 19 Because of the
brief launch windows for rendezvous, very little of
this tonnage could go to a space station,20 but most
or all could be used for other applications, e.g.,
distributed low-altitude networks of tiny satellites
for communications, space surveillance, ballisticmissile defense, or space defense.
If the payload were reduced and the projectiles'
chemical rockets enlarged, the projectile would have
more cross-range capability; the launch windows for
rendezvous with a space station would be longer,
and more payload could be delivered to a space
station per year. However, the launch cost per pound
would increase. Chemical rockets could also be used
to reduce the muzzle velocity required, so that a

13U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Launch Options for the Future: A Buyer's Guide, OTA-ISC-383 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, July 1988), p. 50.
14Miles R. Palmer, "Electromagnetic Space Launch," SA88091 (Mclean, VA: Science Applications International Corp., May 6, 1988).
15Ibid.
16Ibid.
17Miles R. Palmer, personal communication, Oct. 12, 1989.
18A space probe bound for solar orbit or a fly-by of another planet would not require this.
19A greater launch rate could be achieved at greater cost if batteries are not used.
20palmer and Dabiri, op. cit., footnote S.
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smaller21 or more conventional22 direct-launch system could be used.

launching would require 30 to 40 megawatt-hours
(MW-h) of electric power. 23

Laser propulsion would have important advantages over direct launch. Acceleration would be
much lower-about 6 or 7 gs on typical trajectories
to low orbit-so payloads would not have to be
designed to withstand gun-like stresses. Moreover,
no expensive device to store and quickly discharge
gigajoules of energy would be required, as it would
be for a railgun or coilgun, because power would be
beamed to a rocket continuously during ascent.
Perhaps the most important advantage of laser
propulsion is that a simple laser-powered rocket,
unlike an EML projectile, would not require guidance, navigation, and control systems, or a separate
kick motor for injection into orbit

If the system could operate continuously without
downtime for maintenance or overcast, the launch
rate could be almost 60,000 per year. In practice,
occasional overcast would make full utilization
unachievable, and approaching it would probably
require at least two lasers and mirrors, so that one
pair could operate while the other is being serviced.
Even this would not assure operation most of the
time, unless the duty cycle of the lasers (i.e., the
fraction of time they are lasing) is much greater than
the duty cycles demonstrated by industrial and other
high-power lasers (see box 5-A). However, if a
launch rate of 100 per day could be maintained, over
1,600,000 pounds of payload could be launched into
orbit each year. This would be almost twice the
estimated combined capability of current U.S. space
launch systems,24 almost three times the annual
tonnage launched in 1984 and 1985, and about four
times the annual tonnage launched from 1980 to
1985.25

But laser propulsion would require a powerful,
expensive laser and a large, expensive adaptive
mirror. For efficient utilization and low average cost
per launch, both must operate reliably without
maintenance for longer periods than do existing
lasers. And laser launch operations would be halted
by overcast that would not impede direct launch.
Moreover, laser propulsion technology is less developed than EML technology and is predicated on
unproven theories of thermal blooming suppression
and thruster plasmadynamics. Validation of these
theories may require construction of a full-scale
launch system.
An SOlO official has estimated that a 20-MW
carbon-dioxide laser with a 10m-diameter beam
director telescope could launch rockets carrying 20
kg of payload for an incremental cost of about $120
per lb, assuming the laser efficiency is 15 percent,
the rocket efficiency is 40 percent, electricity can be
generated for four cents per kilowatt-hour, and the
structure and propellant each cost about as much as
the electricity. According to the SOlO, the 2mdiameter rocket structure would weigh only a few kg
and would require only about 120 to 150 kg of inert
propellant such as ice or polyformaldehyde plastic;

The SOlO postulates that, in practice, 100 payloads could be launched per day, on the average, and
the average cost could be as low as about $200 per
pound, if capital cost (table 5-1) were depreciated
over 5 years and if annual operating cost (excluding
rocket cost) were comparable to the annualized
capital cost of $90 million. The SDIO estimates that
launching only one or two payloads a day (500 per
year) would be sufficient to reduce average cost to
about $4,500 per pound and make laser-powered
rockets competitive with conventional rockets for
small payloads. Some users might be willing to pay
a premium for the speed with which a laser-powered
rocket could be prepared to launch a payload.
The SOlO estimates that a first launch to orbit
could be attempted about 5 or 6 years after program
start and expects to demonstrate a rocket efficiency
of 20 percent or more in experiments now being
planned. However, the highest efficiency demon-

21Palmer and Dabiri, op. cit., footnote 5, and Henry Kohn and Peter Mongeau, .. An Alternative Launching Medium," IEEE Spectrum, vol. 19, No.
4, April 1982, pp. 30-36.
22Large cannons have been used to launch suborbital projectiles and sounding rockets to altitudes of 400,000 feet; see C.H. Murphy and O. V. Bull,
.. A Review of Project HARP," Anflills of the New York Academy of Science, vol. 140, No. I, 1966, pp. 337-357, and R.O. V. Bull and Charles Murphy,
Paris Cannoneft-The Paris Guns and Project HARP (Springer-Verlag, November 1988).
23Jordin T. Kare, "Pulsed Laser Propulsion for Low Cost, High Volume Launch to Orbit," preprint UCRL-I01139, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, Livermore, CA, June 2, 1989. A different launch simulation program (Kantrowitz, op. cit., footnote 9.) predicts each launch would require
about nine minutes (hence about 20 MW -h of electric power) and about 200 kg of propellant.
240TA, Launch Options for the Future: A Buyer's Guide. op. cit., fooUlote 13, p. 20.
2Slbid., p. 5.

34 • Affordable Spacecraft: Design and Launch Alternatives

Box 5-A-Lasers for Rocket Propulsion: The State of the Art
A laser-powered rocket would use a laser beam, instead of combustion, to heat the propellant, which could be inert
(i.e., noncombustible). The beam could come from a ground-based laser; the rocket could be extremely simple and weigh
only to times its payload. For comparison, the Scout launch vehicle weighs 1,300 times its payload.
Studies of Earth-to-orbit laser propulsion postulate the use of infrared lasers, which could be carbon-dioxide or
deuterium-fluoride electric-discharge lasers or free-electron lasers. The most mature of these is the carbon-dioxide
electric-discharge laser, but free-electron lasers are more efficient. If a carbon-dioxide laser or a free-electron laser
operating at the same wavelength (0.01 mm) were used, the economical laser power would be about 1 megawatt (MW:
1 million watts) per kilogram (kg) of payload, if the laser-powered rockets can achieve the 40-percent energy-conversion
efficiency once predicted by laser-propulsion proponents. To date, only to-percent efficiency has been achieved.
Laser-propulsion experts now predict that at least 20-percent efficiency can been achieved. At this efficiency, a laser power
of about 25 MW might be required to launch a 20-kg payload. If, pessimistically, no more than to-percent efficiency is
achieved, about 50 MW might be required to launch a 20-kg payload.
It appears to be feasible to build such a laser; the U.S. has built a gigawatt (billion-watt) free-electron maser and
electric-discharge lasers of much greater peak power, but none that could produce even to MW average power for ten
minutes, the boost duration required to reach low orbit. Almost a decade ago, the Antares carbon-dioxide electric-discharge
laser at the Los Alamos National Laboratory produced brief pulses with a peak power of 40 terawatts (40 trillion watts).
But a very different design, similar to that of industrial lasers used for welding, would be required for prolonged operation
at high average power. Free-electron lasers have, to date, produced less peak power. A free-electron laser developed by
Los Alamos and Boeing has produced pulses of ten megawatts peak power, but only six kilowatts average power, at a
wavelength of 0.01 mm. In early experiments, the partially completed Paladin free-electron laser at the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory amplified five-megawatt pulses from a carbon-dioxide laser 500-fold, presumably
producing pulses of about 2.5 gigawatts peak power. The carbon-dioxide laser power is being increased to a gigawatt, and
the free-electron laser has now been extended. If its electron accelerator operates at the average power for which it was
designed (at least 25 megawatts), and if 40 percent of the electron-beam power is converted to laser beam power
(comparable to the efficiency demonstrated by a similar free-electron laser at a wavelength of 8.8 mm), the Paladin
free-electron laser would produce a laser beam of at least to megawatts average power. '
Neither carbon-dioxide lasers nor free-electron lasers have demonstrated the duty cycle (the fraction of time a device
operates) that would be required for an operational launch system. The duty cycle of a free-electron laser designed for a
high duty cycle would be limited primarily by the lifetime of the cathode used by the electron accelerator. Loosely
speaking, the cathode is like the mament of a light bulb, and more closely resembles the cathode of a cathode-ray tube such
as a TV picture tube. Several cathodes designed for long life are being tested. Alternatively, an electron storage ring (an
arrangement of magnets) could be used to recirculate the electron beam, as was done in the first free-electron laser and
others.
Focusing a multimegawatt laser beam on a small rocket hundreds of kilometers away is another serious technological
problem; in particular, control of beam-degrading nonlinear optical effects, such as thermal blooming, has not yet been
demonstrated at any average power and beam diameter of interest. Some research sponsored by the Strategic Defense
Initiative Organization (SDIO) is aimed at demonstrating high-power beam control for ballistic missile defense; the beam
control required for propulsion would be more difficult in some respects.
Nevertheless, participants at a 1986 workshop on laser propulsion sponsored by smo and the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency expressed optimism that a free-electron laser and beam director then planned for other purposes
"should be capable oflaunching test payloads to low [Earth] orbit in the early 1990s." smo subsequently established
a laser propulsion program and considered using a free-electron laser and a beam director to be developed for the SDI
Free-Electron Laser Technology Integration Experiment (FEL TIE) to experiment with laser propulsion, even though the
FEL TIE laser would be designed to operate at a wavelength shorter than optimal for laser propulsion.
Subsequent budget cutbacks postponed by at least two or three years the date by which the FEL TIE laser and beam
director could be operating. More recently, smo decided the FEL TIE laser should use a radio-frequency linear accelerator
(RF linac) similar to the one developed for the Los Alamos-Boeing free-electron laser instead of an induction linac similar
to the one used in the Paladin free-electron laser. The Los Alamos-Boeing RF linac produced an electron beam of higher
quality than that produced by the induction linac used by the Paladin laser; however, use of an RF linac may cause the
FEL-TIE laser to produce laser pulses with a waveform that is far from optimal for laser propulsion. This, together with
the nonoptimality of the FEL TIE wavelength, may lead smo to abandon hope of using the FEL TIE laser for laser
propulsion experiments and force smo, perhaps teamed with other sponsors, to develop a laser and beam director
specifically for laser propulsion experiments.
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Table 5-1-Estlrnated Cost of a 2G-Megawatt Laser

for Powering Rockets
Development .............................. $ 75 million
Laser ................................... $185 mllllona
Telescope ............................... $100 million
Adaptive optics ........................... $ 15 million
Tracking ................................ $ 50 million
Power plant .............................. $ 50 million
Structure ................................ $ 50 million
Total capital cost ........................... $450 million
Total nonrecurring cost ., .................. $525 million
BEstimated as $25 million + $8 per watt.
SOURCE: Strategic Defense Initiative Organization.

strated to date is about 10 percent. If only 10 or 20
percent efficiency could be attained, an 80- or
4O-megawatt laser would be needed, and average
cost per pound would be greater than indicated
above. If the cost of the power plant increases in
proportion to its power, average cost would be about
$490 or $275 per pound for 10 or 20 percent rocket
effIciency, respectively, at a launch rate of 100 per
day.26
Because of the brief launch windows for rendezvous only 2 payloads per day could be launched
directly to a rendezvous with the space station.
Payloads launched at other times would take longer
and require more fuel to rendezvous. 27 The SDIO
considers 8 payloads per day to be a conservative
estimate of the number of payloads that could be
launched to rendezvous with the space station each
day. With additional investment, the laser and
rockets could be given more crossrange capability.
This could be done by making the beam director and
rockets larger or by adding a conventional chemical
rocket to the laser-powered rocket.

ISSUES
What could microspacecraft do that conventional
spacecraft couldn't? The consensus of the NASN
SDIO Microspacecrafi for Space Science Workshop
Panel28 was that:

There is a class of science and exploration
missions that can be enabled by microspacecraft
[Le., infeasible with larger spacecraft]. This class of
missions requires many simultaneous measurements
displaced in position .... Examples ... include: 1)
a global network of surface or atmospheric sensors
on planets such as Mars ... , 2) measuring the spatial
and temporal structure of magnetospheres about the
Earth, Sun, or other regions of space, and 3) using
microspacecraft as distributed arrays for either mdio
or optical signals.

They would have another advantage: they could
be launched from Earth orbit toward outer planets
by space-based electromagnetic launchers (railguns
or coilguns) at muzzle velocities that would allow
them to reach their destinations and return data to
Earth years earlier than could spacecraft launched by
conventional rockets. This would accelerate the
cycle of acquiring knowledge.

What is the market for such services? How much
is now spent on conventional spacecraft for space
science which microspacecraft could do? The 1988
NASA budget was about $9 billion, of which about
$1.6 billion was for "space science and applications."29 30 Much of this is for NASA's "great
observatories," such as the Hubble Space Telescope
and the Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Facility, and
for planetary probes such as Galileo. The consensus
of the NASNSDIO Microspacecraft for Space
Science Workshop Panel was that:
Microspacecraft cannot achieve the science objectives of the great observatory missions such as the
Hubble Space Telescope or the Advanced X-my
Astrophysics Facility. Also, intensive, multi-faceted
science investigations such as those of Galileo at
Jupiter cannot be supported by the microspacecraft
concept.... many space science missions will have
to continue to use established technology. Microspacecraft, if they are to be used in deep-space
missions, must establish a new inheritance chain, for
example by being used in near-Earth scientific or
non-scientific missions.

26Calculated by OTA using the laWlch simulation program of Kantrowitz. op. cit., footnote 9. The laWlch simulation program used by Kare,
"Trajectory Simulation for Laser LaWlching," Kare. op. cit. (footnote 10), pp. 61-77, predicts a 50 to 100 percent longer ascent than does Kantrowitz's
program (for the case of 40 percent thruster efficiency) and hence 50 to 100 percent higher electric power usage and incremental cost.
27See P.K. Chapman. op. cit .• footnote 10.
28NASNOAST & SDIO/lST, Microspacecraftfor Space Science Workshop-Report of the Workshop Panel, California Institute of Technology Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, Oct. 6, 1988.
29U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, The NASA Program in the 1990' s and Beyond (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, May
1988); figure 1; see also figure 4 and box 3.
3Cl'fhe Department of Defense space program also includes some focused space science projects.
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An EML, ram cannon, or laser (to power rockets)
may permit microspacecraft to be launched from
Earth to orbit at low average cost, but only if utilized
efficiently. Maximum efficiency would require launching on the order of 10,000 microspacecraft per year.
How much would these microspacecraftcost? Could
space science budgets pay for so many microspacecraft? If not, what other types of microspacecraft
might be launched by such a system to maintain an
efficient launch rate?
Possibilities inc1ude: 31
• low-altitude comsat networks (civil or military);

• "Brilliant Eyes, " "Brilliant Pebbles," or "Small
Dumb Boosters" for a strategic defense system;32
• logistics for a space station or other space
operations. Payloads could include structural
components, fuel, armor, etc.; and
• intercontinental artillery.
The utility of these applications has not been
established. All require further analysis before they
can be used to justify developing a direct-launch
system or a laser and laser-powered rockets. Some
proposed logistics schemes appear more promising
than others. For example. it is probably feasible to
launch Small Dumb Boosters (orbital transfer stages)
with which Brilliant Pebbles could rendezvous and
mate. Some have proposed launching projectiles
loaded with water, liquid oxygen, and liquid hydro-

gen toward the Space Station Freedom, but the costs
of collecting and decanting them have not yet been
estimated.
The risk of satellite collisions would increase
greatly if tens of thousands of microspacecraft were
placed in orbit, unless a means of collision warning
and avoidance is developed. Existing space surveillance systems may be inadequate for tracking tens of
thousands of microspacecraft. although Brilliant
Eyes or Brilliant Pebbles could help with this.
Ground-based lasers could be used to change the
orbits of satellites equipped with slabs of inert
propellant, whether launched by laser or not. 33
However, this may not be adequate for collision
avoidance, because such satellites may pass over
propulsion lasers only infrequently, so advanced
warning of a collision hazard would be required, but
might be costly and subject to false alarms.
Brilliant Pebbles would not require advanced
warning of a collision; they could be programmed to
avert collisions by dodging approaching spacecraft.
They could also be commanded to ram a nonmaneuverable satellite (e.g., a failed Brilliant Pebble) that
posed a threat to more valuable U.S. and foreign
satellites. But a successful intercept might generate
debris and increase the long-term risk to spacecraft.
Collision avoidance schemes based on other technologies developed for antisatellite or ballistic
missile defense applications have been proposed;
some would not generate debris.34

31Mi1es R. Palmer, op. cit. footnote 14.
32These were described above in the section on lightsats. Brilliant Pebbles would weigh tens of kilogram~ore than the lightest microspacecraft,
and more than some lightsats, but still light enough to be launched by laser-powered rocket.
33 A laser could be used to maneuver satellites much heavier than those it could launch into orbit.
340TA has just begun an assessment of technologies for controlling space debris and protecting satellites from it. The assessment was requested by
the Senate Comminee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, its Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, and the House Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology.
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